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Signaling and Plea Bargaining's
Innocence Problem
Russell D. Covey*
Abstract
The dominant theoretical model ofplea bargaining predicts that, under
conditions of full information and rational choice, criminal cases should
uniformly be settled through plea bargaining. That prediction holds for
innocent and guilty defendants alike. Because it is perfectly rational for
innocent defendants to plead guilty, plea bargaining might be said to have an
"innocence problem. " Plea bargaining's innocence problem is, at bottom, the
result of a signaling defect. Innocent defendants lacking verifiable innocence
claims are pooled together with guilty defendants who falsely proclaim
innocence. As a result, both groups of defendants are treated similarly at trial
and in plea bargaining. Signaling defects, however, at least in theory, can be
overcome. As economists have observed, a variety of signaling mechanisms
reliably communicate nonverfiable information among parties. This Article
considers one such signaling mechanism, subwagers, and attempts to
demonstrate their capacity to signal the kind ofprivate information typical in
the plea bargaining context. Not only are subwagers theoretically possible, the
Article argues that police interrogation already functions as such a subwager.
The Article addresses the theoretical basis and empirical evidence supporting
the hypothesis regarding interrogation's important impact on plea bargaining,
and concludes that plea bargaining theory must be modified to take account of
the effects of subwager-type signaling.
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I. Introduction
Plea bargaining has an innocence problem. The dominant theoretical
model of plea bargaining-so-called "trial shadow theory"-predicts that, once
charged, innocent and guilty persons alike almost always act rationally by
pleading guilty rather than contesting guilt at trial.1 Indeed, it predicts that
every case able to withstand minimal pretrial scrutiny should be resolved
(assuming the parties are adequately informed about the evidence and act
rationally) with a negotiated plea bargain.2 By all accounts, those predictions
are not far off the mark. The latest data available indicates that approximately
95% of all adjudicated felony criminal charges are disposed with through guilty
pleas. 3 When more than forty-seven out of every fifty dispositions are guilty
pleas, it is safe to say the theory is on to something.
1. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 2464, 2464 (2004) ("The conventional wisdom is that litigants bargain toward settlement
in the shadow of expected trial outcomes. In this model, rational parties forecast the expected
trial outcome and strike bargains that leave both sides better off by splitting the saved costs of
trial.").
2. See id. at 2466 ("By and large, though, scholars view the shadow of trial as the
overwhelming determinant of plea bargaining.").
3. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 Oro ST. J.
CRiM. L. 37, 42 (2006).
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Plea bargaining's critics have responded to the avalanche of guilty pleas
with a wide range of proposed reforms. Some have advocated total abolition of
plea bargaining; 4 others have urged shifting resources to early screening to
prevent weak cases from being prosecuted.5 Still others have called for more
liberal discovery requirements to increase the amount of information available
to defendants at the time they enter guilty pleas.6 Although there are merits to
all these suggestions, none do much to address the innocence problen--at least
not without imposing costs upon society (in the form of making it harder to
convict the guilty) that society seems ill-prepared to accept. In fact, some of
these reforms-abolition and enhanced pre-plea discovery in particular-might
well make innocent defendants worse off rather than better, or at least more
likely to enter false guilty pleas.
The economic model of plea bargaining highlights the central dynamic
driving the innocence problem: As long as plea prices are determined by trial
shadows, anything that fails to cast a trial shadow is irrelevant to plea prices.
But information that is irrelevant to trial outcomes might not be irrelevant to
other important issues that bear upon just outcomes. Take, for instance, a
defendant's honest but unverifiable belief that she is factually innocent of the
crime charged.7 Although seemingly a highly salient piece of information, such
private information cannot affect plea prices if the defendant has no way to
communicate the information to the prosecutor or a jury. As a result,
defendants who know they are innocent would appear to do no better in plea
bargaining than defendants who know they are guilty.8 In game theory terms,
pleading guilty pursuant to a utility-maximizing bargain is a "dominant
strategy" for guilty and innocent defendants alike, irrespective of the content of
private information.
4. See infra Part Il.B. 1 (discussing the claims of scholars who advocate the abolition of
plea bargaining).
5. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the claims of scholars who advocate limiting
prosecutorial discretion).
6. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the claims of scholars who advocate greater discovery
rights for defendants pretrial).
7. I refer here to an "honest belief' of factual innocence, rather than knowledge, because
some defendants might be honestly mistaken. The exclusion of private information from the
calculation of plea price in that instance enhances accuracy, but I assume for purposes of this
Article that honest mistakes about innocence are rare.
8. A contrary problem arises when the prosecutor holds private information about what
is likely to happen at trial but prefers not to reveal it to the defendant precisely because of the
impact that information will have on the plea price. This can happen, for instance, where an
important eyewitness to the crime dies or otherwise becomes available. For further discussion,
see infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
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Plea bargaining's dominance as a strategy depends, of course, on the
assumptions that one makes about the payoff structure and rules of the game.
Under standard assumptions, private information about guilt and innocence is
irrelevant to plea bargaining outcomes. Under other payoff and rule structures,
however, private information can be made relevant through what economists
refer to as "signaling." 9 This Article discusses one such payoff and rule
structure, which I refer to as a "subwager," that might permit incorporation of
private information into plea pricing to improve the accuracy of the pricing
system. In other words, under certain circumstances subwagers might increase
sentence differentials between defendants who know they are innocent and
those who know they are guilty.
Part II describes the innocence problem in greater detail and demonstrates
why abolition, stronger prosecutorial charge screening, and enhanced discovery
all fail to resolve it. Part III then considers the innocence problem as a
signaling defect. Innocent defendants have private information that is relevant
but not verifiable. Because they cannot reliably signal their innocence in a
manner prosecutors can trust, that private information is effectively lost. Part
III then demonstrates, using a simple card game as a model, how introduction
of a second move-a subwager-might permit private information to have an
impact on plea prices in a way that enhances the accuracy of plea bargaining.
Finally, Part IV considers whether subwagers have any relevance to criminal
procedure as currently practiced or as might be envisioned. It concludes that
interrogation acts as a signaling subwager in some respects and reviews data
gathered by interrogation researchers that support this conclusion. The analysis
suggests that plea bargaining theory must be modified to reflect how pre-trial
signaling impacts plea prices. Contrary to the predictions of the shadow of trial
model, plea bargaining may in some ways actually improve upon trial
outcomes. Signaling also helps explain some of the puzzles surrounding
interrogation, including why courts tolerate police trickery and deception in
interrogation and why so many suspects submit to interrogation
notwithstanding the conventional wisdom that invoking the right to silence is
the better strategy. Finally, the subwager concept suggests further ways that
private information might be harvested to increase the accuracy and reliability
of plea bargaining.
9. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1041
(2006) ("Signaling involves the communication of information that cannot be effectively
communicated through explicit statements of intention or character.").
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II. Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem
A. Trial Shadow Theory
Trial shadow theory provides the dominant account of plea bargaining. 0
According to trial shadow theory, plea bargaining is a voluntary dispute
resolution mechanism that occurs, like settlements in civil cases, in the
"shadow" of trials." Plea bargains are the product of both parties' rational
forecast of trial outcomes, and negotiations take place against this
background.'
2
In a world where plea bargains are negotiated in trial shadows, the most
important factors that determine the terms on which a plea bargain is
negotiated-what I refer to as the "price" of a plea-are (1) the trial sentence
anticipated if the case were tried and resulted in a conviction, 3 (2) the
likelihood that a trial will result in a conviction,' 4 and (3) the resource costs of
trying the case.15 Assuming that prosecutors seek to maximize and defendants
10. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2464 ("Plea-bargaining literature predicts that parties strike
plea bargains in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.").
11. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (examining the impact of the legal
system on negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom in the context of
divorce law).
12. See Robert E. Scott& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1937 (1992) (stating that both prosecutor and defendant must generate an estimate of the
likelihood that defendant will be convicted if the case goes to trial and "that estimate will
determine the price that each will insist on as a condition of reaching a bargain"). Not all
scholars of plea bargaining, of course, agree that plea prices are determined by trial shadows.
See, e.g., Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43, 75 (1988) (criticizing trial shadow theory).
13. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2465 (noting that one of the factors that determines the
plea price is "the likely post-trial sentence").
14. Given any initial charge carrying a standard sentence upon conviction, the primary
pricing variable is the strength of the evidence in the case. Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 58 (1966) ("The overwhelming
majority of prosecutors view the strength or weakness of the state's case as the most important
factor in the task of bargaining.").
15. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1941 (noting that the need to conserve adjudication
costs lowers the plea price, and "explain[s] why the parties might reach a bargain even in cases
where both sides are virtually certain that the defendant will be convicted at any subsequent trial
and have a good idea what the resulting sentence will be"). In most serious cases, the state will
have to pay most resource costs because most criminal defendants are indigent and represented
by appointed counsel. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOw, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 tbl.7 (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (showing that among defendants
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seek to minimize sentences, the price of any plea should be the product of the
anticipated trial sentence and the likelihood of conviction, discounted by some
factor to reflect the resources saved by not having to try the case. 6 A more
refined plea pricing model might also include such additional factors as the
parties' respective risk preferences, agency costs, and discount rates.'
7
Where plea bargain prices are based primarily on expected trial outcomes,
a defendant's ability to negotiate a lenient plea bargain will largely depend on
the strength of the evidence and the potential resource savings from a guilty
plea. 8 Prosecutors should be willing to "pay" greater discounts for guilty pleas
where the evidence is weak or the resource costs of trial are greater relative to
charged with violent felonies in large metropolitan counties, 83% are poor enough to qualify for
court-appointed counsel).
16. See Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM.
ECON. REv. 713, 714 (1988) (defining expected punishment as "the product of the probability of
conviction and the anticipated sentence upon conviction at trial"). This model does not
incorporate what is sometimes referred to as "cooperation bargaining." See Eric Rasmusen,
Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1541, 1552 (1998)
("Cooperation bargaining occurs when the defendant has information to trade, and the gain from
bargaining includes this information, which could be used in other trials."). Cooperation
bargaining, of course, further lowers plea prices because prosecutors are willing to pay a
premium for the information, testimony, or both, that the defendant provides.
17. William Landes developed one of the first and most influential economic models of
settlement. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61,
61 (1971) (stating that "the decision to settle or go to trial depends on the probability of
conviction by trial, the severity of the crime, the availability and productivity of the prosecutor's
and defendant's resources, trial versus settlement costs, and attitudes toward risk"). Frank
Easterbrook supplemented Landes' model by incorporating discount rates and agency costs into
the model. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure As a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 309 (1983) (noting that agency costs are not unique to the plea bargaining process).
In addition, because guilty pleas are substantially cheaper than trials, and because the costs of
trial usually (but not always) are imposed disproportionately on the state, the defendant can
usually command an additional discount in exchange for his plea. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed
Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1237, 1247
(2008) ("[T]he lion's share of process costs are borne by the state, and, as a result, prosecutors
typically gain more than defendants by avoiding trial.").
18. See David Bjerk, Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea
Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain, 9 AM. L. & EcON. REv. 305, 307 (2007)
(explaining that plea prices increase as probability of guilt increases); Easterbrook, supra note
17, at 297 ("As the sentence on conviction and probability of conviction rise, so does the
prosecutor's minimum demand."). For example, where the anticipated sentence upon
conviction is ten years and there is a fifty percent likelihood of conviction, both prosecutors and
defendants should, setting complicating factors aside, be preference-neutral to a plea bargained
sentence of five years or a trial, and where the likelihood of conviction is twenty percent, the
preference-neutral plea price is two years.
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expected trial sentences.' 9 Assuming that guilty pleas are a more efficient way
to resolve charges, however, prosecutors who seek to maximize punishment per
unit of resource should always be willing to pay some discount reflecting those
savings. It seems to follow that rational parties will uniformly prefer to resolve
their cases through guilty pleas rather than trials, at least where they have
reasonably complete information about admissible evidence.20
Most significantly for innocent defendants, the evidentiary strength of a
case should not impact the rationality of resolving a case through plea
bargaining. In cases where the evidence of guilt is strong, only modest penalty
reductions need be offered to induce rational defendants to plead guilty; when
the evidence is weak, however, more significant inducements must be offered.2'
Nonetheless, assuming that the prosecutor's discretion to bargain is unfettered
22
19. As a result, the model predicts that plea bargains will be most generous (and therefore
most frequently accepted) in cases involving misdemeanors and other less serious offenses. The
process costs expended by defendants will be particularly high relative to penalty costs where
only minor penalties are involved. See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT 30 (1992) (arguing that for defendants accused of petty crimes it is the cost of
being caught up in the criminal justice system that is most bothersome). Process costs will also
be increasingly important in cases in which the defendant is incarcerated before trial and the
length of pretrial detention begins to approach the expected punishment upon conviction. See
Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1117, 1138 (2008) (noting that for
innocent defendants, the costs of pretrial detention are relevant if an offer exists that promises
release in a period shorter than the pretrial interval). Process costs may also impose
disproportionate burdens on white collar criminals and the minority of other defendants who
pay for their own legal representation. In each of those cases, the defendant might even be
willing to pay a premium over the expected trial sentence, rather than take a discount, to obtain
the benefits of avoiding a drawn out trial process. Nonetheless, that dynamic does not alter the
fact that both parties maximize their utility by settling the case through plea bargaining.
20. See, e.g., Chantale LaCasse & A. Abigail Payne, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?, 42 J.L.
& ECON. 245, 249 (1999) (stating that models based on minimizing expected sentence predict
that all cases are resolved by plea and criticizing these models on that basis). For reasons that
will be discussed further below, defendants will rarely possess significant private information
about the trial evidence because prosecutors are responsible for developing the inculpatory
evidence, and defendants have powerful incentives to reveal exculpatory evidence before trial.
21. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 14, at 60 (noting "the practice of bargaining hardest
when the case is weakest"); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining
Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 451 (1971) (quoting one attorney who stated, "New York
prosecutors often reduce their sentence recommendations by at least fifty percent if they believe
that there is a fifty percent chance of a hung jury, and by a great deal more if they believe that
there is a fifty percent chance of acquittal").
22. Of course, artificial constraints on bargaining can prevent parties from reaching a
mutually beneficial settlement. As some commentators have observed, mandatory minimum
sentences impede efficient "market resolution" of some cases, especially cases that are
particularly weak (including those brought against the innocent), because they prevent the
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and both parties understand the relevant pricing inputs and hold similar views
regarding their values, they should be able to negotiate a mutually beneficial
plea price even in cases where the defendant would likely be acquitted at trial.23
In short, as long as the prosecutor is willing and able to discount plea
prices to reflect resource savings, regardless of guilt or innocence, pleading
guilty is the defendant's dominant strategy. As a result, non-frivolous
accusation-not proof beyond a reasonable doubt-is all that is necessary to
establish legal guilt.24 This latter point forms the root of plea-bargaining's
"innocence problem," which refers here not merely to the fact that innocent
people plead guilty, but that the economics of plea bargaining drives them to do
so.
It should be noted that many of plea bargaining's defenders are not
particularly troubled by this.25 First, they point out that the innocence problem
is not unique to plea bargaining but rather is a necessary consequence of
imperfect trials.26 If trials perfectly separated guilty defendants from innocent
parties from settling the case through agreement of a sufficiently light sentence to induce a
rational defendant to relinquish his trial right. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1960-66
(arguing that when legislatures draft broad criminal statutes with mandatory minimum
sentences, prosecutors have greater opportunity to overcharge and generate easy pleas).
Mandatory minimums and maximums distort the plea bargaining market in ways similar to
conventional price controls in economic markets by setting price floors and ceilings that bar
transactions that otherwise would occur between willing bargainers. Id. at 1962-65. Abolition
of mandatory minimum sentences might well increase the number of innocent defendants who
plead guilty. But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,
1992 (1992) (arguing that repealing mandatory minimum sentencing laws would have little
effect on the number of innocent defendants who plead guilty). The judicial power to reject
apparently over-lenient plea bargains can have a similar distortive effect. Id. at 1995-96.
23. This is one of the major complaints leveled at plea bargaining. See generally Oren
Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & EcON. 353 (2006)
(arguing for limitations on prosecutorial bargaining discretion to prevent prosecutors from
inducing innocent defendants to plead guilty where evidence is weak).
24. This is because as long as the prosecutor can make a colorable threat of punishment,
there should be some compromise plea bargain that the defendant should rationally prefer.
Anecdotal evidence suggests this is how the system is perceived by defendants. As one defense
lawyer explained in counseling his likely innocent client to plead guilty to a misdemeanor to
avoid trial on serious felony charges, "Once a person is facing felony charges, the issue no
longer is whether he did the crime; it's how to limit the damage." STEvE BOGIRA, COURTROOM
302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 334 (2005).
25. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 599,603
(2005) (arguing that plea bargaining is valuable because it "maximizes deserved punishment"
given resource constraints); Edward A. Ruttenburg, Plea Bargaining Analytically---The Nash
Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 353 (1979) (concluding that plea
bargaining "benefit[s] defendants as a group").
26. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
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defendants, no innocent defendant would plead guilty (at least as long as the
process costs of trial did not exceed the costs of conviction) because every
innocent defendant would go to trial and be acquitted. It is precisely because
trials are flawed, and innocent persons are sometimes convicted, that innocent
defendants might rationally perceive pleading guilty to be the utility-
maximizing option.27 Second, the charge that plea bargaining is unfair or
unduly coercive is challenged by the observation that both prosecutors and
defendants prefer plea bargaining.28 After all, if either party believed that the
bargain was not beneficial, it could simply decline it and go to trial.
Notwithstanding the fact that some innocent defendants are induced to plead
guilty as a result of the plea pricing mechanism, even innocent defendants are
better off with plea bargaining, it is argued, than they would be without it.
29
These arguments have some persuasive force. Given that trials are
imperfect, plea bargaining at least permits some mutually beneficial settlements
that reflect rational criteria, and plea bargaining's outcomes might even be said
to be just in the majority of cases. To the extent that evidence tends to be
strongest against defendants who are "actually guilty," and weakest against
defendants who are innocent, the pricing model seems consistent with
conventional conceptions of justice.3
1970 (1992) ("What disrupts this separation of the guilty from the innocent is not a flaw in the
bargaining process but a flaw at trial.").
27. See id. at 1969 ("Persons at risk of unjust conviction may prefer a certain (but low)
punishment in a plea bargain to the risk of conviction and high punishment after trial."); see
also Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 320 ("Sometimes the evidence may point to guilt despite the
defendant's factual innocence. It would do defendants no favor to prevent them from striking
the best deals they could in such sorry circumstances.").
28. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 309 ("Defendants presumably prefer the lower
sentences to the exercise of their trial rights or they would not strike the deals. Prosecutors also
prefer the agreements; they may put the released resources to use in other cases, thus increasing
deterrence.").
29. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1961 (describing the situation of an innocent
defendant facing a life sentence upon conviction who is offered a discounted sentence of ten
years in return for a guilty plea as "a sad one, but preventing the offer only makes it sadder");
Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 320 (arguing that even where evidence falsely implicates
factually innocent defendants, "[i]t would do defendants no favor to prevent them from striking
the best deals they could in such sorry circumstances"); Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 1975
(arguing that defendants should not be forced to exercise their trial rights as such a rule would
force defendants "to take the risk of conviction or acquittal" even if they prefer "a certain but
small punishment to a chancy but large one").
30. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 48 (1997) (hypothesizing that the "odds of conviction...
correlate strongly with innocence and guilt").
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The strength of the evidence, however, will not always reflect the actual
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Cases that turn on a confident witness's
identification, for example, may look quite strong to a jury but include a large
proportion of actually innocent defendants.3' Similarly, in cases in which the
defense contends mistake, lack of mens rea, or some other hard-to-prove fact,
the evidentiary problem will play a disproportionately large role in the
determination of the plea price.32 In addition, the probability of conviction may
turn on facts that are not strictly related to the strength of the evidence. For
instance, all things being equal, a defendant with a criminal history faces a
higher chance of conviction given the state's ability to impeach him with that
criminal record if he takes the witness stand.33
While replication of trial outcomes is the gold standard in the trial shadow
model, the ideal of replicating trial outcomes points to the limitations of the
model; if plea bargains are a reflection of expected trial outcomes, plea-
bargained outcomes will, by definition, never be any more accurate than trial
outcomes.34 To the extent that trials themselves are imperfect vehicles for
separating the innocent from the guilty, plea bargains cast in trial shadows can
at best only replicate the error rate of the trial system.35 Moreover, given the
31. See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 1970 ("An eyewitness may have made a mistaken
identification. The guilty person may have accused an innocent one to divert suspicion. It is
hard to assess the worth of testimony. Juries give eyewitness testimony more credence than it
deserves.").
32. See id. ("Guilt may depend on the defendant's mental state, which is elusive.").
33. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the
Acquitted, 42 Am. CrIM. L. REv. 1167, 1190 (2005) (presenting data from a sample showing
that juries were substantially more likely to convict defendants that they knew had criminal
records compared with those that they knew did not). The history of the rise ofplea bargaining
shows that when states began allowing defendants to testify under oath in the 1860s and 1870s,
defendants with criminal records faced increasing pressure to enter guilty pleas because their
chances at trial were diminished: Either they testified and were subject to impeachment, or they
declined to testify, in which cases juries almost certainly drew an adverse inference. See
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 STAN.
L. REv. 1721, 1729 (2005) (reviewing GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003)).
34. To be clear, trial shadow theory does not predict that those who plead guilty and those
who go to trial will receive, ex post, the same punishments. Rather, it predicts that defendants
will be offered plea bargains that equal the ex ante expected trial punishment (discounted, of
course, to reflect resource savings). See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2465 ("[The classic shadow-of-
trial model predicts that the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence
largely determine plea bargains.").
35. Like the shadow of trial and abolition theories, other intriguing approaches to
assessing plea bargaining nonetheless share the flaw of presuming that trial outcomes are the
gold standard of measuring the success of any plea bargaining system. For instance, Ronald
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substantial uncertainties inherent in attempting to estimate probabilities of
conviction based on the often skeletal pretrial evidentiary record, outcomes
negotiated in the shadows of trial likely are a good deal less accurate than trial
outcomes themselves.36 Thus, both in theory and in practice, the trial shadow
model depicts plea bargaining as at best a comparable substitution for trial,
lacking any of the collateral benefits of trial (such as the creation of a public
record of the crime and the evidence) but producing substantial savings in
resources, and at worst, a vastly inferior substitute that we put up with, like a
counterfeit Rolex watch, because it is much cheaper than the real thing.
B. Some Proposed Fixes and Their Limitations
1. Abolition
Critics of plea bargaining have amassed an extensive catalogue of
problems with plea bargaining, leading some to conclude that it should be
abolished altogether.37 Although it might well be warranted, abolition of plea
bargaining does not solve the innocence problem. In a world of mandatory
trials, innocent defendants would continue to be falsely convicted of crimes. If
all innocent defendants held out for trial rather than entered guilty pleas, fewer
of them would be convicted. But those who were convicted would receive
proportionately harsher sentences that do not reflect the possibility of trial error
(i.e., innocence).
Moreover, the quality or accuracy of individual trials would not likely
improve in a universal trial system. Even if trials of the same quality now given
to defendants in the five to ten percent of cases currently tried were provided to
all criminal defendants, with no diminution in outcome accuracy,38 prohibition
Wright's "trial distortion theory" begins with the premise that "trial outcomes, by definition,"
are "truthful outcomes." Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 107 (2005).
36. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2494-95 (arguing that as a result of weak discovery rules,
accelerated timing, agency costs, and strategic bargaining tactics like bluffing and puffery,
parties often "bargain blindfolded," substantially diminishing the likelihood that bargains
accurately reflect trial outcomes).
37. For a representative sampling, see generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea
Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652 (1981); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining andlts
History, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 211 (1979); Schulhofer, supra note 22; Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1037 (1984).
38. It has long been widely assumed that more trials would mean less accurate trials. See,
e.g., Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
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would not enhance accuracy over a system of plea bargaining that accurately
represented trial outcomes, as the trial shadow model assumes. 39 And if, as
seems more likely, the quality and accuracy of trial outcomes would decrease if
there were a substantial increase in the number of cases tried, then the accuracy
of convictions in a regime of universal trials would likely be substantially
diminished.40 The abolition of plea bargaining would therefore result in more
innocent persons being wrongfully convicted and sentenced to harsher average
sentences. Even if the trial penalty disappeared (with abolition, defendants
would no longer worry that the decision to contest charges might result in a
higher sentence), some proportion of actually innocent defendants would still
lose at trial and receive the same sentence as their actually guilty counterparts.4'
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 112 (1967) (noting that even if personnel were increased sufficiently to permit more
trials, "[a] lowering of standards in order to man the store adequately may well result in poorer
justice").
39. Of course, actual plea bargains do not perfectly correspond to the shadow of trial
model. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2545 (noting that "[t]rials affect pleas, but so do many other
influences unrelated to the merits"); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548 (2004) (arguing that "there are serious
impediments to efficient bargaining in criminal cases"). But the solution to the imperfect fit
between practice and theory is to improve practice so that it more closely approximates the
theory, assuming the theory posits a model we wish to emulate.
40. Stephen Schulhofer has urged widespread adoption of bench trials as an efficient
substitution for guilty pleas. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1050-87 (1984) (describing effects of Philadelphia's ban on plea
bargaining). Although bench trials may well provide a more preferable mechanism to resolve
many criminal cases than guilty pleas, the traditional right to trial guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, as well as in those of each state, is a right to trial by jury. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the right to ajury trial is a fundamental right
for serious offenses). Whatever a bench trial is, it is not the same as a jury trial, and the justice
bench trials administer would undoubtedly vary widely depending on the manner in which those
trials were conducted. See id. at 156 (noting that jury trials were thought critical by framers, in
large part, "to protect ... against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority").
Indeed, it may be that the real trial error rate is as low as it is simply because the number of
trials is as low as it is. The numerous safeguards that have been built into the modem jury
trial-from the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, the right to confront
and cross-examine hostile witnesses, and the right to introduce relevant expert testimony to the
cumbersome jury selection practices used to maximize the chances of a neutral fact-finding
body-would simply not be feasible if deployed in every case. That observation is banal, but
the fact that the development of this elaborate truth-discovering process was accompanied every
step of the way by an ever-expanding plea-bargaining system is critical. A plea-bargaining
system backed up by a maximally accurate trial check may produce more accurate results overall
than a system of more summary trials with a higher error rate.
41. Example: The standard post-trial sentence for crime Xis ten years. The prosecutor
routinely offers a 50% plea discount. There is a 10% possibility of conviction (POC). The
unitary pricing model predicts the following plea bargain: (10)(0.1)(0.5) = 6 months.
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And assuming the total punishment meted out remains constant, abolition of
plea bargaining would do nothing more than concentrate losses among a
smaller number of unfortunates. It would not, without more, improve the ex
ante lot of the actually innocent defendant.42
The problem is most apparent in weak cases. As noted above, an
unfettered plea bargaining market establishes conditions in which defendants
with strong factual or legal defenses nonetheless are uniformly expected to
receive, and accept, a plea offer sufficiently discounted to make it rational for
them to prefer a guilty plea, a dynamic that looks a lot like coercing innocent
people to plead guilty.43 But barring such persons from making good deals and
Assuming that the average POC of all defendants charged in the jurisdiction is 75%, the average
plea bargain forXcrime, under this formula, should be 3.75 years. Now consider an abolition
regime in which total punishment was held constant. Assume that there are 100 defendants in
the jurisdiction. In the plea bargaining regime, those 100 defendants all plead guilty, producing
375 years ofjail sentences. In an abolition regime, assume that those 100 defendants all go to
trial. Of them, twenty-five will be acquitted, and the other seventy-five will be sentenced to an
average term of five years. For the sake of simplicity, now assume that ten of those seventy-five
defendants had POC's of 10%. In the abolition regime, nine would be acquitted at trial, but the
tenth convicted. However, that defendant will receive, not the discounted sentence, but the full
average sentence: Five years. As a whole, this group often likely innocents fares exactly the
same under the abolition regime as under the plea bargaining regime, with only the ex post costs
redistributed among them.
Now, we might say, as abolitionists like Albert Alschuler have, that the true
"proportionate" or "just" sentence is the average plea-bargained sentence: 3.75 years. If
everybody went to trial, and upon conviction, were sentenced to the average plea-bargain
sentence, then we would see a net reduction of punishment (from 375 years to 281.25 years).
The likely innocents would then benefit, as they would see their expected sentence after trial
(ETS) fall from six months to 4.5 months. But then everybody, including guilty defendants,
would see a decrease in ETS. In a plea bargain regime, defendants with 50% and 90% POCs,
respectively, would have ETSs of 2.5 and 4.5 years. In an abolition regime, their ETSs would
fall to 1.87 and 3.38 years. The point is, reducing sentences for everyone might well be the right
thing to do, but the benefits of doing so flow to all defendants, not just the innocent ones. Such
benefits, moreover, can be achieved simply by reducing maximum trial sentences-there is no
need to abolish plea bargaining to obtain that benefit.
42. This outcome changes if we assume that increasing the number of trials will change
the mix of cases that prosecutors will actually pursue. If prosecutors are induced to prosecute
fewer cases, they naturally will dismiss their weakest cases first, which should improve the lot of
the likely innocents. But reducing the number of cases prosecuted has deterrence costs. The
gains to likely innocent defendants must be balanced against those deterrence losses. Moreover,
there are many ways to reduce the number of cases prosecuted, any one of which will have the
same effect of encouraging prosecutors to drop their weak cases fast. See infra text
accompanying notes 45-51 (evaluating various proposals designed to screen out weak cases).
43. Steven Bogira relates the story of one defendant, charged as an accomplice with
attempted murder, aggravated battery, and a hate crime, and facing six to thirty years if
convicted. BoGmA, supra note 24, at 332-33. Although there was strong evidence against his
two co-defendants, very little evidence connected the defendant with the crime. Id. at 327-30.
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requiring them to stand trial and face a small chance of a large penalty does not
obviously improve their lot.44 Ceteris paribus, abolition of plea bargaining
simply requires defendants to roll the dice. Many defendants, innocent and
guilty alike, would perceive the restriction of choice as an uncompensated loss,
which not only imposes substantial risk on the defendant but also eliminates
both the discount (and the incentive) for minimizing trial costs.
2. Screening and the Capacity/Accuracy Tradeoff
A less drastic way to ameliorate plea bargaining's innocence problem
might be to encourage the dismissal of charges against all defendants where
evidence of guilt falls below some minimum threshold.45 Several scholars have
urged various reforms intended to protect innocent defendants by inducing
prosecutors to screen out cases in which the probability of conviction is low.
Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have argued that "hard" prosecutorial
screening of weak cases would diminish the pressure on prosecutors to plea
bargain and would protect innocent defendants who otherwise might feel
compelled to enter guilty pleas.46 Similarly, proposals to impose a fixed plea
discount, plea-based ceilings, or a partial ban on plea bargaining are all
predicated at least in part on the idea that discouraging pleas in weak cases by
limiting the size of the plea discount not only will force more of those cases to
trial, and thus lead to more acquittals, but also induce prosecutors to dismiss
those cases rather than try them.
47
Nonetheless, when offered an opportunity to plead guilty to a misdemeanor with a guarantee of
no prison, the defendant took the deal. Id. at 334. The judge in the case commented that had it
been him, innocent or not, "he 'probably would have jumped at' the plea offer." Id.
44. This is especially true at the outer margins, where outcome uncertainty is less a
product of evidence and more a product of irrational decisionmakers or trial surprises. As one
defense lawyer and former prosecutor explained, "Sometimes trials bring surprises-surprises
that turn the flimsiest cases into convictions ... . 'Police lie, witnesses lie. It's a fact of life.
So you get the best deal you can and you get out of there."' Id.
45. That is, below some minimum threshold that itself is higher than the mere probable
cause that is constitutionally required to arrest or charge. Some scholars argue-largely based
on assumptions of public confidence--that fewer convictions accompanied by stiffer sentences
in such cases is preferable to many convictions with light sentences. See Wright, supra note 35,
at 111 (arguing that it is "better to have confidence in the accuracy of two convictions with
sentences near full strength, along with one dismissal or acquittal, than to negotiate for three
convictions that produce weaker sentences and inspire weaker confidence").
46. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 32 (2002).
47. The assumption here is that prosecutors will replace time-intensive weak cases with
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These proposals, unlike abolition per se, would in fact marginally improve
the position of some innocent defendants. Indeed, anything that increases the
cost of prosecuting weak cases would reduce the number of convictions of
innocent defendants, not only because any reduction in total convictions will
necessarily reduce the number of convictions of innocent defendants, but also
because innocent defendants presumably make up a larger fraction of weak
cases. 4 8 But, while reducing the number of weak cases prosecuted may be a
desirable goal, there are many ways to accomplish it that have nothing to do
with plea bargaining. For instance, an evidentiary rule barring convictions on
the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness would also
weed out some of the weakest cases on the docket. 49 Greater protections
against the use of deceptive interrogation tactics would limit the number of
false confessions.5 0 More vigorous sufficiency of the evidence review by
more pleadable, and thus more efficient, strong cases. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Fixed
Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining With Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TULANE L. REv. 1237,
1268-81 (2008) (describing a proposal to limit plea discounts through enforcement of plea-
based ceilings); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2295,
2314 (2006) ("[T]he most substantial effect of the partial ban is not an increase in the rate of
trials-it is a change in the prosecutor's choice of cases"); id. at 2324 (arguing that "[w]eak
cases should be dismissed, not settled").
48. That still does not mean that most of the benefits of eliminating weak cases will flow
to innocent defendants. Assuming that most persons charged in criminal cases are, in fact,
guilty, it is probably also true that most defendants, even in weak cases, are guilty. Reducing a
prosecutor's ability to charge weak cases, therefore, will still benefit many more guilty
defendants than innocent ones.
49. See Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture's Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational
Versus Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 10 (2007)
(stating that "the testimony of a single eyewitness, like the testimony of a single conversational
witness, may suffice to convict without corroboration"). Courts have recognized the special
dangers in single-eyewitness cases, but few jurisdictions bar convictions in such cases. See,
e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding conviction in a
robbery case in which the sole evidence against the defendant was testimony of one eyewitness,
but urging the trial court to give a special jury instruction cautioning jurors in such cases).
Experimental research has cast the efficacy of cautionary jury instructions into serious doubt.
See Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 807, 832 (2007) (discussing a study showing that "Telfaire instructions either did
not affect or even decreased the participant's sensitivity to the witnessing and identification
conditions in the simulated trials").
50. See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for
Reconsidering the Legality ofDeceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 ,
794 (2006) (arguing that trickery and deception in interrogation is a significant cause of false
confessions and should be restricted).
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appellate courts would discourage prosecutors from bringing cases in which the
evidence of guilt was marginal.5
There is no doubt that fewer innocent persons will be falsely convicted if
the number of weak cases is decreased, but that is not a reason by itself to place
limits on plea bargaining rather than, say, increase burdens of proof or define
substantive crimes with greater precision. There are a wide variety of ways to
winnow out weak cases, many of which should be considered. But any reform
that focuses on reducing weak cases must frankly acknowledge the costs of
doing so: Anything that makes it harder to convict some innocent suspects by
raising the bar to convictions will also make it harder to convict guilty suspects
as well. As a result, large numbers of guilty suspects will avoid prosecution
and punishment. Undoubtedly, many reforms that would benefit innocent
defendants-such as adopting more demanding evidentiary standards-have
not been adopted because politicians, policymakers, and the general public do
not wish to pay that price.
3. Improved Pretrial Discovery
Under present law, criminal defendants have little right to obtain
meaningful pre-plea discovery.52 Unlike civil discovery, the "criminal
discovery rules are not designed to inform a defendant fully of the case against
him. 53 In busy urban systems, what discovery defendants do obtain often
amounts to little more than the police reports describing their alleged crimes.54
51. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision
in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 355 (2006) (criticizing the "exceptional deference
appellate courts exhibit when reviewing sufficiency of the evidence to convict"). Sufficiency of
the evidence claims are extremely hard for convicted defendants to win, even if they are, in fact,
actually innocent. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 112
(2008) (stating that, of sixty defendants who were ultimately exonerated and whose appeals
included a sufficiency claim, only one prevailed on that ground). Indeed, to the extent that
abolition of plea bargaining does reduce the innocence problem, it does so in precisely this way.
Like hard screening and caps, abolition would increase incentives to screen cases more carefully
because every additional case represents an incremental and fixed tax on scarce resources, which
utility-maximizing prosecutors are assumed to wish to conserve for cases with the highest
likelihood of success.
52. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . ").
53. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 452-53 (2001).
54. See BoGIRA, supra note 24, at 35 (describing a prosecutor who provides "discovery"
to public defenders, and "as usual, this 'discovery' consists mostly of police reports regarding
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Even where significant discovery is mandated, the law often does not require
that it be provided prior to guilty plea hearings. Brady v. Maryland,55 for
instance, requires prosecutors to turn over material exculpatory evidence at or
before trial, but omits any mention of a requirement to provide exculpatory
evidence prior to entry of a guilty plea. 6 As a result, the scope of prosecutorial
obligations to produce such discovery during plea bargaining remains in
doubt5 7  In recognition of this, several commentators have urged that
defendants' rights to such pre-plea discovery be enhanced, arguing that
enhanced discovery is critical to informed plea bargaining. 8 In a system in
which the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved with guilty pleas,
discovery obligations that are not triggered until the eve of trial-if at all-are
likely to have only a minimal practical impact.
If the goal is to sharpen trial shadows and thereby bring plea bargain
outcomes closer to trial outcomes, these proposals are unassailable. By more
fully educating defendants about "[m]ajor procedural uncertainties, such as the
questionable admissibility of significant evidence under the state's evidentiary
the alleged robbery"); id. at 158 (describing a "double-filing system" that permitted police
detectives to shield notes containing exculpatory information in a "street file," while producing a
sanitized "official file" in discovery, thereby evading Brady obligations).
55. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.").
56. Id. at 86-91.
57. In United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on the claim that
pre-plea bargaining discovery is mandated by the Constitution, holding that the Constitution
does not require prosecutors to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or
other witnesses prior to the defendant's entry of a guilty plea, and prosecutors do not violate the
Constitution when they predicate plea offers on waiver of discovery. United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622,623-24 (2002). It remains an open question, however, whether defendants who plead
guilty are entitled to any Brady material. See, e.g., United States v. Coker, 514 F.3d 562, 570
(6th Cir. 2008) (noting that "[p]rior cases have explicitly declined to decide whether and to what
extent a federal defendant who pleads guilty may raise a Brady claim") (citing United States v.
Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234,
1242 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("We do not need to decide today, however, whether a guilty plea waives
a defendant's claim under Brady, or... whether the Brady material must be known to the
prosecution before the plea or merely before sentencing.").
58. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 53, at 517 (arguing for strengthened "pre-plea
procedures aimed at promoting disclosure"); Steven L. Friedman, Preplea Discovery: Guilty
Pleas and the Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 529-35 (1971)
(arguing for enhanced pre-plea discovery to enable defendants to better assess the likelihood of
conviction). See generally Eleanor J. Ostrow, The Case For Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J.
1581 (1981).
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rules, 59 enhanced pre-plea discovery procedures would permit defendants to
better calculate their chances at trial and thereby make more informed plea
bargaining choices.60 Where prosecutors have admissible evidence that
exculpates the defendant, requiring pre-plea production of such evidence will
permit some innocent defendants to reject or favorably renegotiate pleas.
Improved pre-plea discovery, however, will not always benefit innocent
defendants-and certainly will not benefit only innocent defendants. In some
cases, more comprehensive discovery of inculpatory evidence might actually
increase the likelihood that innocent defendants will plead guilty. Trial shadow
theory predicts that plea bargains should be reached where rational parties
agree about case value and can share the resource savings of forgoing trial.6'
By educating defendants about case values, robust discovery should bring the
parties case valuations closer together and facilitate negotiated outcomes. That
result, however, will sometimes cause innocent defendants to plead guilty when
they otherwise might not have. For instance, an individual might know she is
innocent of an alleged crime. Absent knowledge of the state's evidence, she
might rationally contest the false allegations. If the state's case were predicated
on the perjurious or mistaken testimony of an eyewitness to the crime, and she
is convinced after receipt of discovery that a jury might credit that testimony,
however, she might enter a guilty plea that she otherwise would have declined.
Such innocent defendants are better off as a result of improved discovery in the
sense that it induces them to negotiate a punishment-reducing plea. But the
price of the plea they negotiate will incorporate the distorting effects of the
false testimony and wholly ignore her private information of innocence. A
better outcome would be a plea bargain discounted to reflect her private
information of innocence or, better still, dismissal of the charges altogether.
At the same time, more robust discovery rules will permit some guilty
defendants to obtain (arguably) unjustifiably good deals. Informing defendants
about procedural obstacles like missing witnesses, unconstitutional searches
59. Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in
Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REv. 887, 933 (1980).
60. See, e.g., id. (arguing that pre-plea discovery enhances accuracy of pleas because
many defendants do not know all relevant facts, or are compelled to plead guilty by large
sentence differentials motivated by weaknesses in the case of which they are unaware); Kevin C.
McMunigal, Disclosure andAccuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 957, 968-
97 (1989) (same); Schulhofer, supra note 22, at 1998 (advocating more expansive pretrial
discovery "so that negotiating parties could more accurately estimate ex ante the likelihood of
conviction at trial").
61. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2466 (describing the incentives for plea bargaining
underlying trial shadow theory).
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that undermine the admissibility of evidence, unlawful interrogation methods,
and the like, of which they otherwise are unaware, helps guilty defendants as
well as innocent ones avoid punishment.6 z
In short, the enhancement of pre-plea discovery would help to conform
plea bargain outcomes to trial outcomes and is therefore justified under trial
shadow theory. Under that rubric, there is little justification for withholding
such evidence from a defendant, since markets and negotiation work best under
conditions of full information. But enhanced discovery may not increase the
disparity between the plea rate of guilty and innocent persons, and it might even
have the opposite effect. By making it easier to make accurate predictions
about trial outcomes based on a shared evidentiary data set, enhanced pre-plea
discovery may increase both the number of guilty defendants who hold out for
trial and the number of innocent defendants who enter guilty pleas.
Optimally, the plea-bargaining system should not merely replicate
expected trial outcomes, it should resolve cases with greater accuracy and
normative validity than a system of trials alone. To achieve that goal, however,
plea bargaining must itself generate information that would not otherwise be
available. In the next Part, I will suggest that the innocence problem might best
be addressed by modifying the bargaining process to better incorporate the
defendant's private information into the price structure. Only by increasing the
total amount of information in the system can the innocence problem be
diminished.
III. The Innocence Problem as a Signaling Defect
As game theorists have observed, although there is no direct way to tell
whether any disclosure of private information is truthful, sometimes one can
indirectly infer the content of private information "from the actions that the
informed party takes. ' ,63 The communication of information in this way is
referred to in economics as "signaling. "64 As one leading text on game theory
62. Courts routinely refuse to overturn guilty pleas where prosecutors withheld
information highly relevant to the probability of conviction at trial, but not relevant to the
defendant's substantive guilt of the charges. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41,42 (N.Y.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978) ("[The] defendant was not denied due process when
the District Attorney's office did not disclose during plea negotiations that it had received
information that the complaining witness had died.").
63. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 122 (1994).
64. See id. at 123 (discussing the concept of signaling).
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explains, "[s]ignaling takes place when those who possess nonverifiable
information can convey that information in the way they choose their actions. ,
65
For signaling to occur, at least one party must have private information
and an economic incentive to communicate it. Those conditions are typical of
plea bargaining.66 Defendants usually know if they are innocent or guilty, and
innocent defendants have powerful incentives to communicate their private
information to prosecutors. The ease by which guilty defendants can mimic
nonverifiable innocence claims made by innocent defendants, however,
prevents prosecutors from taking those claims seriously. 67 Observing this,
Dean Robert Scott and Professor William Stuntz characterize plea bargaining's
innocence problem as, at bottom, a signaling defect.
68
This is not to say that private information does not have an impact on the
disposition of cases. The defendant's subjective knowledge of guilt or
innocence affects the bargaining process and thus case outcomes, in several
ways. First, defendants who perceive themselves to be guilty are probably
more likely to discount their chances of acquittal at trial, and defendants who
perceive themselves to be innocent may be more likely to believe they will be
acquitted.69 Moreover, as Scott and Stuntz argue, factual knowledge of guilt or
innocence should improve the defendant's ability to forecast future evidentiary
70developments. Innocent defendants know that newly discovered evidence
will be more likely to exonerate than to incriminate them.71 In addition,
65. Id.
66. See IAN MOLHO, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: LYING AND CHEATING IN MARKETS
AND ORGANIZATIONS 10 (1997) (noting that, absent an effective signal, the underlying method of
conveying private information loses value where that information is otherwise nonverifiable).
67. See id (comparing the denials of a criminal defendant to common lies that one hears
often in everyday life). As Molho explains, using the classic "market for lemons" problem to
illustrate, "the consequence of having 'liars' present in the population (who may try to pass off
bad cars as good, say) is ultimately to degrade the information content of the communication
('this is a good car'), conceivably up to the point where it becomes meaningless." Id.
68. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1944 (discussing the relationship between
signaling and plea bargaining, specifically the use of prior criminal conduct as a signal).
69. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 59, at 924 ("[An individual defendant's knowledge
of his own guilt or innocence seems likely to skew his perception of his chances of acquittal at
trial.").
70. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1937 (explaining that "[w]hat [the Defendant]
actually did and thought thus bears powerfully on any prediction about what evidence is likely
to come out during the course of further investigation" and thus can be "critical" to the accuracy
of predictions about probability of conviction).
71. See David Bjerk, Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea
Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 305, 306 (2007)
(arguing that "any new evidence that arises in the time leading up to trial generally strengthens
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innocent defendants who testify at trial may be more convincing than guilty
defendants. Their stories will naturally cohere because they need not fabricate
exculpatory, and potentially disprovable, lies on the witness stand.72 Based on
that information, they should calculate a more accurate, and lower, probability
of conviction than the prosecutor. In addition, private information about guilt
or innocence may affect a defendant's desire to go to trial. Some guilty
defendants are no doubt moved by remorse to plead guilty irrespective of their
expected chances at trial. Innocent defendants may also be more motivated to
contest charges than guilty defendants among the general pool of defendants
with the same statistical likelihood of conviction.73 These factors suggest that
private information affects how individuals respond to plea offers at any given
price.74 Innocent defendants, knowing they are innocent, may be more likely to
reject plea offers, while guilty defendants might be more likely to accept those
offers.
75
But none of these factors suggests that the private information has much
effect on plea prices themselves. Prosecutors cannot infer anything reliable
about the defendant's private information based on their responses to plea
offers because too many other factors influence plea evaluation. As Dean Scott
and Professor Stuntz observe, the signal sent by innocent defendants through
the case against a guilty defendant, but generally weakens the case against an innocent
defendant").
72. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARv. L. REv. 430, 448-49
(2000) ("Accounts furnished by innocent suspects are generally more credible than those
provided by guilty defendants."). Innocent defendants may also be better able to provide
detailed accounts of the facts, which has been found to increase credibility. See Jansen Voss,
The Science of Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and the Science Behind the Art of
Persuasion in the Courtroom, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 301, 309 (2005) (finding that
possessing "a command of details" increases one's credibility).
73. On the other hand, in practice, where defendants resist acceptance of plea offers based
on assertions of actual innocence, the frequent response is not rejection of the offer, but rather
pressure from the defendant's lawyer to take the discounted offer notwithstanding the accuracy
of the defendant's assertion. See DEBRA S. EMMELMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A STUDY OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE WORK 114 (2003) (noting that defense lawyers must "continue to advise
their clients about the virtues of plea bargaining" even when the client desires trial).
74. Unbridgeable differences in case evaluation, therefore, might marginally improve the
accuracy of the sorting process in plea bargaining. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 59, at 924
(noting that "[defendants] who were guilty would be statistically overrepresented in the group
who chose the plea and those who were innocent would be statistically overrepresented in the
group who rejected the plea in favor of a trial").
75. See WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATrORNEYS IN
CAPITAL CASES 169 (2006) (finding that innocent defendants are more likely to reject plea offers
than guilty defendants).
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their higher price demands is indistinguishable from the comparatively higher
price demands of those who heavily discount the future or who are less risk-
averse. 76 Since criminals likely are (almost by definition) less risk-averse and
heavy discounters, the "innocence signal" implicit in the rejection of a plea
offer is almost certain to be imperceptible to prosecutors. 7 Accordingly,
prosecutors cannot adjust plea prices based on unverified defendant signals of
innocence. The plea bargaining "game" thus results in a "pooling
equilibrium '78 in which defendant's private information is not incorporated into
the price of the plea.79
This might not be the case if there were a mechanism to leverage privately
held information so that it had a more direct impact on plea pricing. Scott and
Stuntz note that perjury sanctions, in theory, could be used to provide such
leverage. 0 If guilty defendants who tried to send false innocence signals could
be identified and adequately punished for lying, they would not falsely claim
innocence. In this ideal world, only innocent defendants would claim
innocence. Prosecutors could trust that signal and adjust their plea offers
accordingly. Of course, as Scott and Stuntz point out, there is no practical way
to enforce truth-telling with perjury sanctions. First, the only way to verify the
truthfulness of an innocence claim would be to conduct what is, in essence, a
trial.8' Doing so obviates any resource savings from plea-bargaining and
therefore nullifies its benefits. Guarantees that are too costly to enforce will not
be enforced. Second, the penalties for perjury would have to approach or
76. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect
Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992) ("[It is likely that] innocent
defendants as a class are significantly more risk averse than guilty defendants as a class, [so] a
prosecutor's failure to internalize a defendant's private information will cost the prosecutor
nothing because the defendant, even if innocent, will take the deal anyway.").
77. See id (arguing that innocent defendants, on the whole, are more risk-averse than
guilty defendants).
78. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1911 (noting that "strategic impediments to
efficient bargains lead to a pooling of guilty and innocent defendants," which in turn "leads
predictably to innocent defendants being offered (and taking) the same deals as guilty ones").
79. Not only does the defendant's private knowledge not affect plea bargaining prices, it
does not affect trial outcomes in the event the case is tried. In fact, precisely because the
defendant lacks any way to verify his private information at trial, private information is
irrelevant to a plea pricing system predicated on anticipating trial outcomes. See Seidmann &
Stein, supra note 72, at 458 (noting that "mere augmentation of private information---that is, of
any information with uncertain credentials---could not increase the factfinder's accuracy").
80. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1943 (considering the effectiveness of raising
the penalty for lying).
81. Id.
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exceed those of the substantive crime charged to have any likelihood of
inducing truth-telling, an unrealistic prospect.82 Third, only some innocence
claims would be verifiable even with trial-like verification methods. Because
nonverifiable innocence claims have no independent value to prosecutors, an
enhanced perjury regime would still be gameable by savvy guilty defendants at
least some of the time. For all of those reasons, enforced truth-telling is not
itself a practical way to verify innocence claims.83 Scott and Stuntz thus
conclude that there is no feasible way to incorporate private information into
84plea pricing. But, perhaps Scott and Stuntz's conclusion is overly pessimistic.
In the next section, this Article considers ways in which an alternative signaling
mechanism might be devised.
A. Signaling Mechanisms
The literature on signaling provides numerous examples of signaling
mechanisms that can, under certain assumptions, effectively communicate
private nonverifiable information between parties based on players' actions.
Michael Spence's leading analysis of signaling illustrates the basic features of
an effective signaling mechanism. 85 Spence models a labor market in which
previously obtained educational credentials function as informational signals
regarding otherwise unverifiable applicant attributes. 86 The model assumes that
there are two types of workers: high-productivity workers and low-productivity
workers. 87 Employers are willing to pay higher salaries to high-productivity
workers than to low-productivity workers, and all workers, of course, prefer
82. See id. at 1943-44 (explaining that penalties for lying must be set so high to work that
they "would conflict with basic criminal law norms of proportionality"); see also Seidmann &
Stein, supra note 72, at 460 ("To deter perjury, the punishment for lies must exceed the
punishment imposed for the underlying substantive crime."). On the other hand, it could be
argued that for perjury sanctions to impact a defendant's choice to lie, the added punishment
need not outweigh the punishment for the charged crime. It would be enough if the marginal
risk of extra punishment for perjury tipped the balance in favor of accepting a discounted guilty
plea rather than hazard the risk of conviction and enhanced punishment.
83. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 63, at 122 (stating that private, nonverifiable information
cannot be compelled through legal rules).
84. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1943 ("None of these devices [to incorporate
private information into plea pricing] can be relied upon by prosecutors and defendants to
overcome their information barriers.").
85. See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. EcON. 355 (1973).
86. Id. at 361-68.
87. Id. at 361.
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high salaries to low ones. 8 To win high-salary job offers, applicants must
convince employers that they are high-productivity (or "good") types and not
low-productivity (or "bad") types.8 9 All applicants tell employers that they are
good types, so without further information, employers disregard all such
statements.90 Good types thus need to find a way to reliably signal their type to
employers, and employers need a way to reliably separate good types from
bad.91 Spence's model then demonstrates how educational attainment could
serve as a signal of an employee's type in such a job market.92
In developing the job market signaling model, Spence makes the following
assumptions about education. First, Spence assumes that obtaining an
education is costly-it requires substantial investment.93 Second, the costs of
obtaining the educational attainment necessary to constitute the signal are
assumed to be differentially distributed. 94 That is, the costs of obtaining the
education signal are assumed to be high for low-productivity workers but low
for high-productivity workers. Because of these differential costs, it is rational
for high-productivity workers-but not low-productivity workers-4o invest in
education.95  Third, these differential costs are logically related to
productivity.96 If educational attainment were not positively correlated with
high productivity, employers would lose interest in hiring such persons, and
educational attainment would fail as a signal.97 Finally, education can serve as
an effective signaling device only if the increase in salary sufficiently
compensates high-productivity workers so that the benefits of obtaining the
education are not outweighed by the costs.98 As Spence notes, however,
88. Id. at 362.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 356.
91. See id. at 357 (discussing "the endogenous market process whereby the employer
requires (and the individual transmits) information about the potential employee, which
ultimately determines the implicit lottery involved in hiring, the offered wages, and in the end
the allocation ofjobs to people and people to jobs in the market").
92. See id. at 361--68 (analyzing education as a signal).
93. Id. at 358.
94. Id. at 362.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 358.
97. See id. at 367 (noting that where there is an "absence of any correlation between
educational costs and productivity, education could never be an effective signal, in the sense of
conveying useful information, in an equilibrium" where such conditions exist).
98. Id. at 362.
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depending on the specific values assumed, job market signaling may lead either
to separating, semi-pooling, or pooling equilibria.99
Spence's job-market signaling model functions based on past player
commitments,'00 but signaling mechanisms need not be backward looking; they
could turn on present conduct as well. In capital markets, for instance,
investors might have difficulty distinguishing good and bad investment risks.
Some firms make high profits, others do not, but all firms hold themselves out
as high-profit companies, and it might be difficult or costly to verify such
claims. If high dividend payments cost less for a company with high profits
than for a company with low profits, however, then payment of high dividends
might effectively signal that the firm is a high profit company.' 0' The signal is
reliable because of the differential costs: It cannot easily be copied by low
profit firms. 1
02
Indeed, it turns out that there are a wide variety of ways in which signaling
costs can produce effective signaling mechanisms. Reliability in some cases
might be indicated by the payoff structure confronting potential signalers.
Reputation, for example, exhibits such a payoff structure. 0 3 Developing a
99. See id. at 361-68 (analyzing the effect of different values for education as a job
market signal).
100. See id. at 360 (noting that employers' valuation of a specific signal is based on its past
performance).
101. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Capital Markets, in FiNANCIAL ECONOMICS:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 96 (Cathryn M. Cootner, Paul H. Cootner & William F.
Sharpe eds., 1982) (developing a signaling model in which payment of dividends signals
profitability to uninformed investors). Similarly, it has been argued that the financial structure
of a firm may serve as a signal of expected profits, where companies with high debt rates signal
confidence in high future cash flows sufficient to profitably pay off the debt, and high equity
ratios signal lower expected profits. Id. at 120-21 (citing Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle,
Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371
(1977); Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling
Approach, 8 BELL J. ECoN. 23 (1977)).
102. Reputation is also a signaling mechanism that functions by sending information to
others about one's type. Parties will seek to maintain a reputation for being a good type so that
others will transact with them under conditions of uncertainty. When the long-term interests of
a market participant exceed potential short-term gains, the need to maintain a good reputation,
and thereby protect one's access to the market, provides strong guarantees to potential
transaction partners against short-term cheating. Even though a claim is nonverifiable at the
time of transaction, eventual discovery of the claim's falsity will undermine the party's ability to
make credible claims in the future with the deceived party or, more generally, with all other
parties who have access to reputational information. See BAIRD Er AL., supra note 63, at 159-87
(discussing reputation as a signal in the context of repeating games).
103. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 509,534-50 (1994) (discussing
the incentives for lawyers to develop a cooperative reputation as a signal for clients).
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good reputation requires players to visibly forgo opportunities to cheat. Players
that forgo those opportunities lose out on the short-term benefits they otherwise
might have earned. As a result, reputation is costly to develop and maintain.
Precisely because the good-reputation player has invested substantial resources
in the cultivation of reputation-an investment she logically will seek to
protect-her signals are perceived as trustworthy (at least as long as the short-
term benefits of deception do not exceed the sunk costs of cultivating a
reputation).'°4 Because of this last point, signaling models in which reputation
provides an effective signal assume repeat play.10 5
More broadly, any credible commitment of resources that "locks in" a
player's strategy functions as a reliable signal. A manufacturer that makes
large capital investments in production capacities, for example, signals to
potential competitors its commitment to compete in a particular market since,
having made the investment, it would be plainly irrational subsequently to
abandon it. Such sunk-cost commitments can effectively dissuade competitors
from encroaching into the market, because competitors know that the
incumbent manufacturer's committed investment limits potential profits
available from the entry of a new market competitor. 0 6 Similarly, sunk-cost
signals can be exchanged between manufacturers and consumers of products
through advertising. For instance, assume that a company makes an
inexpensive, disposable razor and is considering an expensive national
advertising campaign to promote the razor. To justify the advertising costs,
consumers must make repeat purchases of the razors, and consumers will only
buy the product a second time if the product in fact is high quality. If the
economics of the decision to advertise is common knowledge, the very act of
advertising signals the manufacturer's private information that the razor is high
quality. Because advertising is only economical to the seller if a consumer in
fact makes repeat purchases, and the consumer will only make repeat purchases
if the product is high quality, the consumer can interpret the seller's willingness
to advertise as a signal that the seller's product is high quality.0 7 After all,
104. All bets are off, economically speaking, when the stakes rise sufficiently high. Indeed,
this is the basic ploy used by card sharks and pool sharks who lull their prey with false ineptness
in small stakes early rounds, cultivating an appearance (reputation) that makes others willing to
play and then breaching in the "money game."
105. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 63, at 167 (noting that the incentive to cultivate
reputation disappears when the competitors "act as if they are playing a one-shot game").
106. See id. at 58-62 (using the example of an established cement plant in a small town
and an upstart company to demonstrate the usefulness of signaling through sunk cost
commitments).
107. See MoLrO, supra note 66, at 95 (noting that under the specified conditions "it is
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rational manufacturers would not choose to advertise if they knew their razors
were low quality, and knowing this, consumers can buy the razor with greater
assurance that their small investment will be rewarded. The buyer's marginal
willingness to take a small risk (buy a razor of unproven quality) is increased by
the buyer's observation of the seller taking a larger risk in aggressively
marketing the product.
Although signals must always be costly, an effective signaling mechanism
need not be based on sunk-cost investments. Some signaling mechanisms work
because they are backed by enforceable promises about future conduct. A
warranty is a kind of insurance contract that shifts the risk of product failure, at
least in part, to the producer. In commercial markets, for instance, warranties
signal a seller's private information about the quality of a particular product to
buyers who may be unable independently to test or verify quality. It may be
relatively cheap for the seller to offer a warranty at the time of sale, but it is
costly to have to perform on the warranty at a future date. The signaling value
of the warranty derives from the fact that future costs are borne differentially.
If the costs of offering a warranty are inversely proportional to the quality of the
warrantied product, then only the producers of high-quality goods will offer the
warranties. Buyers need not seek additional information about the quality of
the product and can assume that any producer who offers a warranty is selling a
high-quality product. At least under those conditions, the warranty effectively
separates high- and low-quality producers.
0 8
In short, there are a variety of ways to construct an effective signaling
mechanism. Risks can be transferred among parties (warranties), prior
investments that reflect private information about type can be made (education),
or actions consistent only with type, and that are difficult to fake, can be
currently taken (high-dividend payments). In many instances, signaling is
possible only because the players are engaged in multiple rounds of play
(reputation, advertising).
Although they differ in operative structure, effective signaling
mechanisms appear to share four important characteristics. First, signaling
mechanisms do not work unless the signals sent are reliable. For a signal to be
reliable, it must be costly.'0 9 Cost-free signals can be sent by anyone interested
possible to construct a separating equilibrium where only the sellers of high quality brands
advertise").
108. See id. at 30 (discussing the role of warranties as providing "a credible way of
informing the buyer about quality" and thus an example of a potentially effective signaling
device); see also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 63, at 124 (same).
109. See AMorz ZAHAvI & AVISHAG ZAHAvI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE, at xiv ("[I]n order
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in communicating the message, and as such, are worthless. Second, not only
must signals be costly to send in general, the cost of the signal must vary with
its content. 10 It is the differential cost of signaling that guarantees the signal's
reliability."' Third, signals cannot be arbitrary. The nature of the signal must
be logically related to the content sought to be communicated. That is, it must
be well suited to "convey the specific message it carries." 12 Fourth, signaling
must be economical. If signaling costs exceed signaling benefits even for those
whose signaling costs are cheapest, then all parties will be better off forgoing
signaling."l
3
to be effective, signals have to be reliable; in order to be reliable, signals have to be costly.").
The Zahavis developed an evolutionary theory of signaling. See id. ("The investment that
animals make in signals is similar to the handicaps' imposed on the stronger contestants in a
game or a sporting event: for example... the extra weight the swifter race horse must
carry .... ").
110. See Assaf Likhovski, Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal Transplants
and Signaling 8 (Tel Aviv University School of Law Working Paper Series, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=- 1098179 ("In order to prevent those not possessing the quality from
mimicking the signal, signals may sometimes be costly, that is there will be a link between the
signal's cost and the quality it signifies in a way which would make the signal too costly to
produce by deceivers.").
111. See ZAHAi & ZAHAVI, supra note 109, at 57-59 (explaining that if the "cost of a
signal is reduced to the extent that every individual can use it equally well, then the signal can
no longer reveal differences in the quality or motivation of individuals"); id. at 59 ("If there is
no cost, nothing prevents cheaters from using a signal to their benefit and to the detriment of the
receivers, and that signal will lose its value as a signal."); see also Spence, supranote 85, at 358
(noting that a negative correlation of signaling costs and the subject that is signaled, which in
Spence's study is the productive capability of employees, "is a prerequisite for effective market
signaling to take place"). The prerequisite of differential costs is referred to in the signaling
literature as the "single crossing property." As Molho explains,
[Tlhe single crossing property is that from any given situation it costs more for low
quality types to increase the signal than it does for high quality types, whether the
signal is a warranty on a used car, education, or whatever. Without this property
the signal is bound to fail to communicate information, since there would be
nothing to prevent low quality types from imitating high quality types in the signals
they send.
MOLHO, supra note 66, at 79 n.7.
112. ZAHAvi & ZAHAvi, supra note 109, at 229. Zahavi and Zahavi elaborated on this
point with the following:
The Handicap Principle states that the receiver of a signal has a stake in the signal's
reliability, or accuracy, and will not pay attention to it unless it is reliable. Thus
signals are not arbitrary; rather, each signal is the one best suited to reliably convey
the specific message it carries. It follows that there must be a logical connection
between the message and the signal.
Id.
113. See Spence, supra note 85, at 367 ("[E]ffective signaling depends upon not only the
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It should also be noted that, in the language of game theory, different
signaling regimes can give rise to different types of equilibria. An optimal
signaling regime produces a separating equilibrium, that is, one in which
receivers could differentiate signalers with perfect accuracy and treat each
according to type.1 14 But separating equilibria are not the only possible type of
equilibrium. Also possible are semi-separating (or semi-pooling) equilibria-in
which some separating (and some pooling) occurs although the separating is
not complete-and pooling equilibria-in which the signaling mechanism fails
and the signalers wind up being "pooled," i.e., treated in a nondifferentiated
manner. 
115
The critical question here is whether the conditions characteristic of plea
bargaining permit the operation of a signaling mechanism that produces at least
a semi-separating equilibrium. Certainly, many of the above-noted strategies
are not readily adaptable to plea bargaining. 116 Take the pre-commitment
strategy. Criminal records function a bit like educational degrees in the job
market and in that sense perform important signaling functions in plea
bargaining. A criminal defendant's innocence claim almost certainly
diminishes in credibility as the extent of the defendant's criminal history
increases, particularly where the conduct reflected in that criminal history is
similar to the newly alleged crime. But criminal history is too blunt an
instrument to accurately signal private information about guilt or innocence in
particular cases. If anything, it signals propensity to commit crime rather than
conduct with respect to a particular historical incident. Indeed, the rules of
evidence generally bar admission of criminal history at trial precisely because
negative correlation of costs and productivities, but also upon there being a 'sufficient' number
of signals within the appropriate cost range.").
114. See MOLHO, supra note 66, at 78 (introducing the concept of a separating equilibrium
in the context of job market signaling).
115. See id. (discussing the various levels of separation and pooling equilibria in the
context ofjob market signaling).
116. Price itself is a signaling device. See id. at 43 (explaining how price can signal quality
of products when information is imperfect and transaction costs are significant) (citing Asher
Wolinsky, Prices as Signals of Product Quality, 50 REv. ECON. STUD. 647 (1983)). Bebchuk
considers the signaling impact of settlement price in the context of settlement of civil disputes in
which two parties must decide whether to settle or litigate a contract dispute. Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND. J. ECON. 404,408
(1984). As Bebchuk explains, if we assume that both parties will agree to settle if the settlement
price is lower than their expected costs after trial, but that the trial outcome is not certain
because one of the parties possesses private information that will not be revealed until trial, a
separating settlement offer will be possible, in which defendants with positive private
information will reject the offer and defendants with negative private information will accept it.
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fact-finders all too easily, and thus potentially falsely, treat propensity as a
strong, perhaps overwhelming, signal of guilt."1 7 Criminal history signals one's
"type" in the sense of one's propensity to lawfulness, but it does not signal
one's culpability as to specific charges." 8 Unlike employers seeking employees
with the propensity for hard work, criminal adjudication requires conclusions
not about propensity but about specific historical instances."
9
The warranty model also seems inapt. As Scott and Stuntz observe, the
closest analogy to warranty in plea bargaining is enforced truth-telling through
perjury sanctions. 12 The threat of harsh future penalties for perjury in theory
could work as a kind of prosecutorial insurance policy, but enforced truth-
telling is not workable in plea bargaining for the reasons identified by Scott and
Stuntz.12' To obtain performance on the warranty, the buyer must adduce a
demonstrably defective product before the seller will be willing to perform.
That is relatively simple to do when a lawn mower or a car stops working. It is
much less feasible in the event of an innocence claim that can only be tested by
117. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,318-19 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(observing that character evidence such as criminal history "has traditionally been off limits
during the guilt phase of criminal proceedings because of its tendency to inflame the passions of
the jury").
118. This is why, as Josh Bowers explains, recidivist offenders are not only more likely to
commit future crimes but are also more likely to be falsely accused of committing them. Josh
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1117, 1119-21 (2008). Moreover, unlike
employment decisions, the stakes in a criminal case involving serious charges are simply too
high to expect much utility from reading a criminal history signal. First-time offenders have
powerful incentives to misrepresent their private information of personal guilt, at least if charges
are serious, and prosecutors know it.
119. For similar reasons, a defendant's reputation will not likely provide much valuable
signaling information in the plea bargaining context. A criminal defense lawyer's concern with
reputation, however, might make possible a different kind of signaling device. As Frank
Easterbrook has noted, criminal defense attorneys might invest substantial capital in developing
a reputation for truthfulness with prosecutors, and when both sides know this is true, their
occasional unverifiable representations that a particular client is "innocent" could provide a
useful and trustworthy signal to prosecutors. See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 1971 ("A good
part of the practice of many defense lawyers, especially in the period before indictment, is
supplying information to prosecutors."). This assumes that criminal defense lawyers have
private information not possessed by prosecutors. Typically, however, defense lawyers have no
private information, merely what their clients give them-which they no more than prosecutors
can verify. Defense attorneys intent on acting as intermediaries between innocent clients and
prosecutors will thus have to develop their own mechanisms to distinguish between true and
false innocence claims.
120. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1942-44.
121. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons why enforced
truth-telling does not work in the plea-bargaining context).
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trial. In short, it will be too difficult to collect future payment for present
breaches.
But reliance on criminal history and the threat of perjury sanctions are not
the only possibilities. As I explain below, the key to creating an effective
signaling mechanism in the context of plea bargaining is to reconceptualize it as
a multiple-move game rather than a single-move game. As it turns out,
strategies that are dominant in a single-move game might not be dominant in a
game containing multiple moves. In the next section, this Article illustrates
how a single-move game in which private information is irrelevant to
settlement prices can be transformed with the addition of a second move in a
way that makes the private information relevant.
B. The Two-Move Subwager Game
In this subpart, this Article seeks to illustrate a type of signaling
mechanism with applications to plea bargaining. It does this by examining the
impact of rule changes on a simple two-player card game, which works as
follows. Gambler (G) is dealt four cards from a standard deck of playing cards,
two of which are red and two are black. The cards are placed in a pile. G
"wins" if the bottom card in his pile is red and "loses" if the bottom card is
black. Thus, if G turns over the bottom card and it is red, he gets to keep his
money. If the bottom card is black, however, he must pay the House (H) $20.
H, though, values not having to play out games, and is willing to accept 50%
less from players to save "dealing costs." Accordingly, G can opt out of the
game by paying a $5 fee to H.122 One need not be a mathematician to see that a
rational player seeking to minimize losses should pay the fee (and get out of
this no-win game as quickly as possible). Gamblers who follow that strategy
will, over the long run, fare better than gamblers who choose to play out the
game in the hope of "winning."
Thus far, even though only half of the Gamblers would lose, there is no
differentiation of strategy among would-be winners and losers. That outcome
potentially changes when private information is introduced. Imagine the same
rules as above, except that now G-and only G-is entitled to look at (and
keep) the top card. 123 G may not show the card to H. Although G does not
122. Expected Payout (EP) = 20(.5) = 10, discounted by 50% = 5.
123. In this game, the player gets to look at the top and not the bottom card. This
information helps him assess his chances at the game, but it does not give him certain
knowledge as to how the game will play out. This rule is intended to mimic the position that
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know how his hand will play out, he has additional private information
unavailable to H. If the top card in G's possession is black, G now knows that his
chance of winning (i.e., that the bottom card is red) is two-thirds. What can G do
with this new information? He might try to renegotiate the settlement price, based
on the fact that he now knows his chance of losing is only one-third rather than
one-half. After all, the true "market value" of his settlement is now lower, given
the lower odds that he will have to pay full price if the game is played out. Under
the assumptions used so far, the "real" market price of settlement should be
$3.33.24 But G will be unable to extract that price through direct negotiation. H
won't drop its price simply because G represents that the card he holds is black.
After all, if it credited his claim, every player would have an incentive to claim
the top card was black, and without an ability to corroborate the claim, the House
would be unable to differentiate honest and dishonest reports.
Alternatively, G could play out his hand. The private information assures G
that the odds of winning are better than initially reckoned. However, G has no
rational incentive to play out, because the risk of playing and losing is still too
great (i.e., G's expected payoff if the game is played out is $6.66).121 That is
worse than the $5.00 settlement offer currently on the table. Thus, even though G
has private information that permits him to more accurately assess his chances of
prevailing in the game, that private information does him no good. Settling by
paying the fee remains the dominant strategy.
G's problem is that he is unable to directly communicate his private
information to H in a way that gives H reason to act on the information. What is
needed, of course, is some signaling mechanism by which G could indirectly, but
reliably, communicate his private information to H. This mechanism can be
created by adding a second move to the game in the form of a "subwager." The
subwager might be set up as follows: Hand G would agree that, although G still
cannot show his "up card" to H, the remaining three cards would be shuffled and
one turned over. 126 If that card turns up red, H must settle the case for a greatly
defendants face in plea bargaining, in which their private information of factual guilt or
innocence is relevant to their assessment of what will happen at trial, but not a reliable indicator
of trial outcomes.
124. EP = (1/3) x (20) = $6.66. If G's EP is now $6.66, then G can pay 1/2 of $6.66
($3.33) as a settlement price.
125. EP = (probability that G loses) x (amount G will pay if he loses) = (1/3) x ($20) =
$6.66.
126. The shuffling must be presumed not to change the actual outcome of the game.
Perhaps, prior to shuffling, a third party would note the color of the down card, which would be
revealed if the game was played out.
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discounted price, say, a quarter of the initial settlement offer: $1.25. If the card
turns up black, however, H will greatly increase the settlement price to, say, $10.
In this two-move game, G's decision to accept the subwager will turn on his
private information. That is, if G's privately held card is black, G will have a
strong incentive to accept the wager, since G knows that two-thirds of the
remaining cards are red.127 If G's privately held card is red, however, G will have
an equally strong incentive to decline the wager and settle for the initial offer
price, since G knows that the odds are that he will lose if the game is played out.
This can be verified by looking at how expected payoffs change once the private
information and second move opportunities are introduced. If G's up-card is
black, he knows that he will win the subwager in two of three plays (because the
remaining three cards include two reds and one black), and thus that his expected
payoff if he settles after the subwager is $4.16, an almost 20% improvement over
the initial settlement offer.
28
Gamblers with positive private information will do even better than this,
however, because those that lose the subwager will still know that their chances
of prevailing if the game is played out are better than initially forecast. With this
knowledge, they know that their real expected payoff from playing out the game
at that point is only $6.33, rather than the $10 initially forecasted in the absence of
the private information. If that adjustment is made, then G's real expected payoff,
if he accepts the wager, is only $3.63.129
If G's privately held card is red, on the other hand, he will do markedly
worse by accepting the wager, since now he knows there is a two-thirds chance
that his bottom card will be a losing black card. In that case, his expected payoff
if he accepts the subwager is $7.09.130 Because in this latter case the initial
settlement offer of $5 is better than the expected payoff from taking the subwager,
Gs with unfavorable private information rationally should decline the subwager
and settle at the initial offer price.
Understanding this, H can confidently make differential settlement offers to
Gs depending on their responses to the subwager. The subwager mechanism
127. And thus that the bottom card-which determines whether G wins or loses-is likely
to be a winning red card.
128. ESUB = P(wB) (HO) + I-(P(wB)) (AO) = (.667) (1.25) + (.333) (10) = 4.16, where
ESUB = expected price if subwager is accepted, P(wB) is probability of winning if a black card
is the private up-card, HO is the House's offer in the event that G wins the subwager, and AO is
the alternative offer in the event G loses the subwager.
129. That is, either he settles for the $1.25 if the card comes up, as expected, red, or he
plays out if the card unexpectedly comes up black, in which case he has a two-thirds chance of
winning (and thus his expected payout is only $6.33).
130. ESUB = 1-(P(wB)) (HO) + P(wB) (AO) = (.333) (1.25) + (.667) (10) = 7.09.
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reliably signals the private information of Gs and thus improves the accuracy of
the game. Without the subwager, every gambler should accept the initial
settlement offer. But only half of those Gs would actually have "lost" had they
played out the game. 131 In the single-move game, therefore, would-be losers
and winners alike would settle on the same terms. In the two-move game,
however, private information has an impact on settlement prices.
The two-move game produces more accurate results in the sense of
lowering the expected payoff of gamblers who likely would have won had the
game played out, and increasing the expected payoff of gamblers who likely
would have lost. That result should not be surprising. After all, by modifying
the rules to enable G to view one of the cards, we have increased the amount of
information in the system. But under the single-move game the same
information could have been made available and yet, as we saw, have no effect
on strategies. Setting up a second move allows that additional information to
be factored into the payoff structure of the game.
This simple game is intended both to illustrate the point that it is possible
to change a game's rules to make previously irrelevant private information
relevant to the pricing mechanism and to provide a crude parallel model of the
pricing dynamics at work in plea bargaining. 132 In the model, the House
represents the prosecutor, gamblers represent defendants, and the dollar figures
represent the respective punishment imposed on defendants to resolve their
cases. Defendants can pay the Prosecutor a "fee," that is, accept a negotiated
punishment, or they can "play out," that is, go to trial. Defendants in criminal
cases often have private information about their "type," that is, whether or not
131. The game is error free because it is always possible to verify with 100% certainty
whether the bottom card is red or black.
132. A more complicated game that more realistically captures the dynamic of plea
bargaining might factor in mutual incentives to avoid "playing out" hands. In such a game
dealing would not be cost-free. Instead, if G chooses to play out the game, H must incur a $15
"dealing" fee. Now, if G plays out the game and loses, H nets $5. If G wins, however, then H
loses $15. G's expected payoff from the game, therefore, is $5. Rational Hs will be no more
interested in playing out the game than will rational Gs. Everyone will be better off ifG simply
pays Hthe $5 fee rather than playing out the game. In that situation, G's payout is $5, and H's
is $5.
Now imagine that the parties could bargain over the fee. G is better off with a negotiated
settlement rather than playing the game out as long as the fee does not exceed $10. H is better
off negotiating than playing as long as the fee exceeds $5. There is a wide range of negotiated
fees that would make both parties better off. Assuming the two sides split the difference, the fee
would be set at $2.50.
I do not develop this more complex model here because it is unnecessary for purposes of
illustrating the signaling function of subwagers, which are equally effective in communicating
private information in both the simple and the complex versions of the game.
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they are factually guilty. Defendants, however, do not have any private
information about whether the legal system will find them guilty, although their
private information enhances their ability to predict outcomes. To replicate that
dynamic, the game allows players to view one of their cards, providing
information that enhances the player's knowledge of the probabilities, but still
not know with certainty what will happen if the game plays out. The game,
moreover, satisfies the basic criteria for reliable signaling: 133 The signaling is
costly because making a bad subwager leads to predictably worse outcomes
than making a good subwager; the costs of the signaling are differentially
distributed; the signal is logically related to the message (whether the player is
likely to win or lose the game); and accepting the subwager is economical for
the relevant subgroup.
134
There are, it should be acknowledged, several problems with using the
card-color game to analyze plea bargaining as it occurs in practice. 35 One of
the biggest is the problematic quality of private information regarding guilt or
innocence. Most scholars have assumed that private information of guilt or
innocence enhances the information-holder's ability to assess the probability of
conviction. 136 This is predicated primarily on the assumption that the private-
information-holder's knowledge can help him predict whether as-yet-
undiscovered or undisclosed evidence will be inculpatory or exculpatory. In
133. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (describing the basic criteria
necessary for reliable signaling).
134. Although I think it is conceptually useful to think of the subwager as a signaling
device, technically speaking, some might describe it instead as a "screening" device. See
generally Joseph Stiglitz, Sorting Out the Differences Between Signaling and Screening Models
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Technical Working Paper No. 93, 1990) (defining games in
which the informed move first as signaling games and games in which the uninformed move
first as screening games). The distinction is not relevant to the analysis presented here.
135. The game's assumptions, of course, diverge from plea bargaining in real life in a
variety of ways. The game assumes that parties have full information about the probabilities and
make rational decisions based upon them, whereas in real life the parties rarely, if ever, have full
information, may frequently disagree about the probabilities, and often act irrationally. Similar
criticisms are frequently made of any attempt at economic modeling of human decisionmaking.
The typical rejoinder is that analytical techniques employed by economists and game theorists
based on assumptions such as rational choice do not presuppose that those assumptions are
always, or even usually, consistent with empirical reality. Rather, they attempt to uncover
logical relationships useful for constructing predictive theories and testable hypotheses.
136. See Bjerk, supra note 18, at 306-07 (assuming defendants can better predict the
probability that they will be convicted in arguing that guilty defendants will accept longer plea
bargains than innocent defendants); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1936-37 (explaining that
a defendant, especially an innocent defendant, can better assess the probability of conviction
than the prosecutor because the defendant knows more about what new evidence may or may
not be found later).
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the card-color game, the private information held by the player (regarding
attributes of his hand) increases the player's ability to predict the outcome of
the game.
The assumption that private knowledge of guilt and innocence is helpful in
predicting trial outcomes, however, will not always hold true. In some cases,
the parties can be reasonably confident that no yet-to-be-discovered evidence
exists and that the universe of admissible evidence is a closed set.' 37 In such
cases, the private information has no predictive value. In other cases, private
information may lead to incorrect predictions about future evidence. Although
it may sometimes be true that truthful witnesses are more credible, some
empirical data suggests that the opposite may also sometimes be true.
38
Because witnesses who lie often carefully rehearse their stories, their accounts
are delivered in an (artificially) coherent and confident fashion. 3 9 Fact-finders
often misperceive such coherence as an indication of sincerity. "' In contrast,
characteristics common to truthful testimony, including imperfect recall of
details, inconsistency, and a less-confident delivery, can be misinterpreted by
fact-finders as signposts of falsity. 14 1 In short, the degree to which factual
innocence improves the odds of acquittal, and thus the degree to which private
information regarding factual guilt will improve a criminal defendant's ability
to estimate trial outcomes, varies from case to case. It may be significant in
some cases and trivial or nonexistent in others.
Second, the payoff structure makes a critical difference in determining
whether private information is transmitted. As the card-color game
demonstrates, at least under some conditions a two-move game can provide
137. Imagine, for example, a simple assault or robbery case, in which the prosecution
evidence consisted solely of the victim's eyewitness identification of a suspect, who asserts as
an alibi that he was home, alone, sleeping at the time the crime occurred.
138. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe ofthe Hands, A Lick ofthe Lips: The Validity of
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1157, 1194 (1993)
(reviewing social science experimental data indicating that speaker cues that are "popularly
believed to manifest deception are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those which
are actually observed during deception").
139. See Margaret Talbot, Duped: Can Brain Scans Uncover Lies?, NEW YORKER 52, 52
(July 2, 2007) ("A liar's testimony is often more persuasive than a truthteller's.... People who
are afraid of being disbelieved, even when they are telling the truth, may well look more nervous
than people who are lying."). See generally Charles F. Bond & Bella M. Depaulo, Accuracy of
Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 214 (2006) (analyzing extensive
research results regarding an individual's ability to discern whether another person is lying or
telling the truth).
140. Talbot, supra note 139, at 52.
141. Id.
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greater price accuracy than a single-move game. Players with positive private
information can utilize it to obtain better outcomes than players who either lack
the information or have negative private information. But minor changes in the
payoff structure can destroy these beneficent effects.
If we assume that players have access to private information whether or
not they have an opportunity to make the subwager, the private information
itself will perform an anti-pooling function, but only if the initial plea discount
does not exceed a certain magnitude.142 A gambler who learns that the color of
the top card is black also knows that the odds that the bottom card is red have
risen from one-half to two-thirds. That information permits the gambler to
revise his estimate of the cost of playing out from $10 to $6.66. However, as in
the example above, where the settlement discount is 50%, the expected cost of
playing out after incorporation of the private information still exceeds the initial
settlement offer of $5. Under those conditions, players will settle rather than
play regardless of the nature of the private information. If the settlement
discount narrows, however, the private information can tip the decision point
towards rejection of the initial settlement offer. A 25% settlement discount
would be large enough to entice gamblers with no private information (or
negative private information) to settle, but not big enough to entice gamblers
with positive private information to settle. They would be better off refusing
the deal and playing out.
14 3
In sum, while an effective signaling mechanism can be designed in theory
by using the subwager concept, that result occurs only when certain conditions
are satisfied. Still, subwagers can improve the accuracy of plea prices
compared with trial shadow pricing models alone by incorporating heretofore
unaccounted private information into the pricing mechanism. But to be
effective, the subwager must be based on information that has a meaningful
relationship to the actual guilt or innocence of defendants, and must be
embedded within a set of bargaining rules calibrated to make the subwager
outcome relevant to optimal plea-bargaining strategies. In the next Part, the
Article will discuss the use of subwagers in practice. As it turns out, at least
142. Bjerk makes this point in positing that a defendant's private knowledge of guilt should
make him "willing to accept a longer plea bargain sentence than an otherwise similar appearing
innocent defendant." Bjerk, supra note 18, at 307.
143. The ability to "capture" private information by enforcing a narrower plea/trial
sentence differential provides a powerful justification for enforcing strong limitations on the
differential. For a discussion of how such limits might be practically and effectively enforced,
see Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea-Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82
TUL. L. REv. 1237 (2008).
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one feature of current criminal procedure-interrogation-already functions,
coincidentally or not, much like the subwager device described above.
IV. Interrogation and Sub- Wagers
In this Part, I argue that the procedural mechanism best suited to perform
the separating function necessary to achieve the goal of more accurate plea-
pricing is interrogation. Building on the insights of Seidmann and Stein's path-
breaking game-theoretic analysis of the privilege against self-incrimination, 44
the Article argues that the decision to cooperate or not cooperate in the pretrial
investigation satisfies (in a partial way) the essential prerequisites of a signaling
mechanism. Submitting to interrogation is costly to criminal suspects, and that
cost is imposed differentially. Interrogation is not cost-free for innocent
suspects, but innocent suspects' costs are less-sometimes far less-in
submitting to interrogation than those of guilty suspects. Moreover, the signal
produced in interrogation-cooperation in the interrogation room--is logically
related to the subject of the signal: The suspect's guilt or innocence. And
interrogation is, or at least can be, an economically rational move for innocent
suspects.
A. Cooperation as an Anti-Pooling Device
In a fascinating analysis of the privilege against self-incrimination,
Seidmann and Stein apply game theory to interrogation. 145 In so doing, the
authors attempt to refute the classical assumption that only the guilty benefit
from the right to silence. 46 They argue "that the right to silence helps to
distinguish the guilty from the innocent by inducing an anti-pooling effect that
enhances the credibility of innocent suspects." 47 Guilty suspects, they argue,
face a difficult strategic position, which they liken to "zugzwang," a concept in
chess signifying a situation in which all available moves worsen a player's
144. See generally Seidmann & Stein, supra note 72. For critical commentaries on the
Seidmann and Stein thesis, see Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the
Guilty, 88 IowA L. REv. 421 (2003); Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty andAcquitting
the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925 (2002).
145. See generally Seidmann & Stein, supra note 72.
146. See generally id.
147. Id. at 433.
SIGNALING AND PLEA BARGAINING'S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 111
strategic position. 48 As Seidmann and Stein explain, a guilty suspect in the
interrogation room is in zugzwang.149 Telling the truth is not a good strategy
for the guilty suspect because doing so entails confessing to a potentially
serious crime.150 Lying is also treacherous. If the suspect is caught lying, his
guilt will be both obvious and easier for the prosecutor to prove.' 5 ' Silence,
however, is certain to signal guilt and may improve the prosecutor's ability to
prove it if the suspect's silence can be brought to the jury's attention.'52
The choice confronting suspects in the interrogation room can be depicted
in the following two-by-two matrix:
Exoneration Self-Incrimination
Disclosure 0(b) -20(nb)
Silence X -10
For innocent defendants, the payoff associated with truthful disclosure of
the facts as they know them is high: If their account of innocence is believed,
the police will exclude them from further investigation, and they will be
exonerated.13 If their account inculpates them in the crime, however, or is
verifiably false, their decision to disclose in the interrogation room will be a
bad one, and they will self-incriminate. Silence, on the other hand, promises no
chance of exoneration. The suspect who refuses to answer his interrogator's
questions will look guilty in the interrogator's eyes, and his silence will
probably lead to further investigation. 15 4 This outcome is plainly worse than
exoneration, but much better than self-incrimination.
Seidmann and Stein argue that the key contribution of the right to silence
is to create a meaningful opportunity for strategic decisionmaking, which in
turn is a precondition for the existence of a signaling opportunity.15 When
148. Id. at 441-50.
149. Id.
150. Id. at443-44.
151. Id. at 445-46.
152. See id. at 444 ("Silence or false responses in the face of criminal accusations usually
signal guilt.").
153. In the matrix, b = believed, and nb = not believed. An X denotes that a particular
outcome is impossible, given a particular choice. The numerical value represents the utility or
disutility resulting from the choice.
154. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 72, at 444 ("[I]f [a suspect] were to opt for
silence... the police and prosecution would infer his factual guilt and would therefore devote
more time and effort to securing his conviction.").
155. See id. at 467-68 (comparing interrogation strategies of guilty suspects when there is
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exposed lies and silence are equally harmful to the suspect's position, the best
strategy for a rational suspect is to lie; whereas silence is both damning and
certain, lying is only incriminating if the lies are exposed.5 6 It follows, then,
that rational guilty defendants will lie as long as silence is incriminating. A
guilty suspect's lies, however, impose costs, or externalities, on innocent
suspects.'1 7 Because innocent suspects' nonverifiable but true innocence
claims are indistinguishable from the nonverifiable and false innocence claims
of guilty suspects, both sets of innocence claims will pool. 158 Fact-finders will
not be able to distinguish the true innocence claims from the false ones. As a
result, all innocence claims will be discounted, which makes innocent
defendants as a group worse off.
Robust rules safeguarding the right to silence, however, change the
incentive structure of guilty suspects. Because silence does not carry the same
incriminating consequences as unsuccessful lying, guilty suspects have an
incentive not to lie but to invoke the right to silence instead. 159 To make silence
a truly rational option, however, the right must be made as robust as possible, a
need reflected in cases like Griffin v. California160 and Doyle v. Ohio'61 that
extend the right to silence as far as, and perhaps beyond, its practical if not its
logical limits.162 The goal is to make silence the best strategy for guilty
defendants but not innocent ones. Where that happens, the marginal value of
an unverifiable innocence claim increases to the benefit of innocent suspects
who can cheaply make such claims.
63
and is not a right to silence).
156. Id. at468.
157. Id. at469.
158. Id. at 468-69.
159. Id. at 469.
160. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (barring comment on defendant's
silence at trial).
161. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) (prohibiting adverse inferences
based on defendant's silence at custodial interrogation).
162. Observers have frequently pointed out the implausibility ofjurors actually ignoring a
defendant's trial silence. Some argue that Griffin extends the privilege well beyond its
justifiable purposes. See, e.g., Charles Hobson, The Minimalist Privilege, I N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 712, 713 n. 16 (2005) (arguing that cases like Griffin demonstrate the "privilege has
strayed from its moorings"). These critics may be correct as a matter of history, but they are
missing the functionality of a robust privilege.
163. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 72, at 469 (explaining that juries will only believe
innocent suspects' claims of innocence under a system in which guilty suspects would have no
incentive to lie).
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Seidmann and Stein's analysis provides a neat explanation for the
privilege, and one that may be, as they contend, more intrinsically persuasive
than the deontological defenses that have been advanced by the privilege's
defenders. 164 The plausibility of Seidmann and Stein's account, however,
depends largely on the plausibility of their assumption that false statements
made by lying suspects "pool" with true statements made by innocent suspects
in a way that "might impair the credibility of statements given by innocent
suspects.', 65  This claim appears problematic in one important respect. If
Seidmann and Stein mean that a nonverifiable innocence claim has diminished
credibility at trial as a result of the pooling effect, that claim seems
conspicuously implausible. 166  Juries do not consider the credibility of
innocence claims in the aggregate, but usually only the credibility of the
innocence claim proffered by one defendant on trial. 167 Jury trial is generally
not a comparative business, and jurors do not go about considering or assessing
the "market value" of nonverifiable exculpatory statements. Jurors also have
limited ability to compare innocence claims intertemporally because they are,
by and large, one-shot actors who lack the opportunity to assess credibility with
sufficient frequency to reflect any conceivable externality effect.
68
But if the externality argument is implausible as to jury trials, it seems
quite plausible with respect to police and prosecutors, who are repeat players
and who undoubtedly do assess a suspect's credibility in light of their
164. See id. at 503-04 (contending that the anti-pooling rationale for privilege "outscores
its competitors by both justifying and coherently explaining each branch of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence").
165. Id. at 457-58.
166. Seidmann and Stein seem to imply that juries rationally respond to the market value of
exonerating statements at several points in their article. See, e.g., id. at 469 ("By remaining
silent, the guilty suspect therefore separates herself from the suspicious (and all other) innocent
suspects. As a result, the jury draws a favorable inference from any exculpatory statement, and
innocent suspects (who alone make such statements) are thus acquitted, regardless [of other
evidence in the case].").
167. Occasionally, juries might have to make a comparative judgment about the credibility
of competing innocence claims. For example, they might be faced with such a situation if
multiple defendants are charged with the same crime and tried together, and each defendant
points the finger at his codefendants. See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 535-36
(1993) (discussing trial of four defendants for possession of narcotics found in a car and a box
in an apartment when each defendant disclaimed knowledge of the drugs and argued that the
drugs belonged to one of the other defendants).
168. See Van Kessel, supra note 144, at 953 ("[T]oday's jurors often sit for only one or
two trials and have little or no market savvy or experience. Today's jurors rarely return to the
market place of exonerating statements.").
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comparative experience with other criminal suspects. 169 It would not be at all
surprising if police and prosecutors' ability to evaluate the truthfulness of a
suspect's innocence claim marginally decreased where suspects were forced to
manufacture exculpatory lies in response to questioning.170 Some guilty
defendants who otherwise would have remained silent would incriminate
themselves absent a right to silence, but others would lie successfully, or at
least in a manner that left the question of their credibility in doubt. And these
additional plausible but nonverifiable innocence claims would pool with those
made by actually innocent defendants, as Seidmann and Stein's analysis
predicts.171
The shift in the pooling argument's focus from jurors to police and
prosecutors has interesting consequences for plea bargaining. Since the
"externality" problem is not likely to change the way a jury would assess the
credibility of any particular defendant's innocence claim, the existence of a
general right to silence would not seem to have any effect on individual
defendants' probability of conviction. Does it then follow that the right to
silence has no impact on plea prices? The trial shadow model would seem to
suggest that it does not because plea prices only reflect expected trial
outcomes.172 Indeed, in a world in which the only thing that matters is expected
trial outcomes, submitting to interrogation looks like an act of ignorance or
insanity. After all, the defendant who submits to interrogation at best does not
harm his case; any self-serving or exculpatory statements will be inadmissible
at trial.
173
169. See id. (pointing out that police and prosecutors are more likely to be aware of a
changing market in exonerating statements by defendants than trial jurors).
170. See TOM BUCKE ET AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 199, THE RIGHT OF SILENCE:
THE IMPACT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1994, at 34-36 (2000) (U.K.),
available at http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/horsl99.pdf (showing no increase in
confessions in Great Britain despite an increase in the number of suspects answering questions
following changes in the law permitting evidentiary use of silence).
171. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 72, at 503 (arguing that, absent a right to silence,
all guilty suspects would lie during interrogation, and thus, fact-finders would be unable to
distinguish between true and false testimonies).
172. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1937 (stating that both the prosecutor and the
defendant must generate an estimate of the likelihood that the defendant will be convicted if the
case goes to trial, and "that estimate will determine the price that each will insist on as a
condition of reaching a bargain").
173. In a few rare situations the refusal to cooperate with police can be used at trial as
evidence of guilt. Pretrial silence thus sometimes increases the likelihood of conviction, and
thus reduces the plea price. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (finding that
adverse inferences may be drawn from a defendant's post-arrest silence prior to receipt of
Miranda warnings); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (finding that adverse
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Unless one is prepared to characterize the vast majority of suspects as
insane or ignorant, something else must be leading them to submit to
interrogation. That something, I think plainly, is signaling. Suspects in the
interrogation room are faced with a strategic problem that functions, essentially,
like a subwager. They can accept the subwager and cooperate with the
interrogation, or they can decline the subwager by invoking their right to
silence.
The rewards and risks are distributed similarly to those in the card-color
game. Suspects who successfully exculpate themselves effectively bargain
their way out of further prosecution by convincing the police or prosecutor that
the costs of prosecution exceed any possible benefits. Suspects who talk and
incriminate themselves, in contrast, greatly cheapen the price of their pleas,174
in some cases (where they confess) by virtually eliminating outcome
uncertainty and thereby reducing the value of the plea to the value of the
resource savings of foregoing trial. 175  Suspects who do not talk at all
marginally decrease the value of their pleas, but not because the silence can be
used against them at trial. Rather, their plea values decrease because their
silence signals that they have something to hide. 1
76
inferences may be drawn from a defendant's pre-arrest silence). The point of the robust law
protecting the privilege, however, is to minimize silence's evidentiary value.
174. Cassell and Hayman report empirical data showing that "defendants whom police
successfully questioned were less likely to receive concessions in plea bargaining." Paul G.
Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects
of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 911 (1996). The data indicated that defendants who
cooperated with interrogators and succeeded were three times more likely to win charge
bargaining concessions in the district studied than defendants who made incriminating
statements. See id. (finding that 30.6% of confessing defendants pled guilty without a reduction
in offense level, while only 9.4% of suspects who were interrogated but did not incriminate
themselves did the same).
175. This obvious consequence is borne out by empirical evidence showing, not
surprisingly, that suspects who confess during interrogation plead guilty in very large numbers.
See PAUL SOFTLEY, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 61, POLICE INTERROGATION: AN
OBSERVATIONAL STUDY IN FOUR POLICE STATIONS, at 45 (1980) (U.K.), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors61.pdf (reporting that "[o]nly two among 57
suspects who had made a confession pleaded not guilty, whereas 12 of 34 suspects who had not
made a confession pleaded not guilty").
176. Silence also decreases the value of the silent suspect's plea by increasing the
investigatory burden on the state. Information that it might have obtained cheaply from the
suspect now can only be obtained by investing additional investigatory resources in the case.
See id. at 41 (describing police questioning as providing "a short cut to the successful
conclusion of an investigation" based on interview research findings that "[in over 30 per cent
[sic] of cases investigating officers said that, if the suspect had refused to answer their questions,
they would have tried to obtain additional evidence"). As with all investments, the state will
expect a return, and will be willing to pay less for the plea as a result. This conclusion is
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Thus, apart from any information obtained in the course of the
interrogation, the very act of choosing to submit to interrogation or to remain
silent reveals valuable private information. By treating the signal as an
important piece of information that is relevant to plea price, the interrogation
subwager should, in theory, have a partially separating effect on a pool of
defendants that trial shadow theory would fail to distinguish-namely, suspects
who cooperated with interrogators and made no incriminating statements and
suspects who refused to cooperate and, therefore, also made no incriminating
statements. As a result, prosecutors should be expected to treat noncooperating
suspects differently than cooperating suspects, even where the objective post-
interrogation probabilities of conviction are identical.
A review of empirical data generated in several frequently cited studies
supports this analysis. First, there is some reason to believe that the decision to
cooperate with interrogators correlates with guilt and innocence. What little
empirical research there is exploring the reasons why suspects waive their right
to silence and talk to police questioners suggests that the decision is often based
on a belief that the police will presume them guilty if they refuse to
cooperate. 177 The presumption that non-cooperation signals guilt is made by
the innocent even more than the guilty, as was evidenced in one study that
found that innocent persons will waive their Miranda rights and talk to the
police at significantly higher rates than guilty persons. 178 This data supports the
view that the decision to cooperate itself is indicative, although certainly not
dispositive, of a suspect's personal assessment of guilt or innocence.
supported by the empirical data. Cassell and Hayman's data, for instance, indicates that
defendants who refuse to cooperate in interrogation are less likely to obtain a plea concession
than suspects who submit to questioning and don't incriminate themselves. Cassell & Hayman,
supra note 174, at 911. This research indicates that 15.4% of silent suspects pleaded "to
charges at the same level as initially filed," while only 9.4% of unsuccessfully questioned
suspects pled to the same charges. Id.
177. Viewed in light of its signaling implications, the consistently high rate at which
suspects voluntarily submit to questioning notwithstanding the right to silence is more easily
understandable. See, e.g., Timothy O'Neil, Why MirandaDoes Not Prevent Confessions: Some
Lessons from Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and Oprah Winfrey, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 865
(2001) (attempting to answer the question "why after all these years do suspects persist in
waiving Miranda and confessing to the police?").
178. See Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights:
The Power of Innocence, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 215 (2004) (finding in a mock
interrogation following an incident in which half of the subjects committed a mock crime and
half did not, thirty-six percent of the "guilty" subjects waived their Miranda rights, while eighty-
one percent of the "innocent" subjects waived rights and talked to police).
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Second, data gathered in two leading studies of interrogation supports the
hypothesis that a suspect's decision to cooperate has tangible consequences for
plea bargaining. Richard Leo conducted what is probably the leading
American investigation of police interrogation and its consequences. 17 9 In the
study, Leo observed 122 police interrogations in person and an additional 60
videotaped interrogations.180 He then traced the impact of interrogation on case
outcomes. 181  In particular, he attempted to determine the comparative
significance of invoking or waiving Miranda rights on case outcomes, and if
there was a waiver and subsequent interrogation, of the consequences of a
successful interrogation (i.e., incriminating statements were obtained) versus an
unsuccessful interrogation. 182 A second, widely cited, study was conducted by
Paul Cassell and Bret Hayman. 183 In the Cassell and Hayman study, the
researchers participated in screenings of more than 200 felony charge filings.' 84
Based on these screenings, the researchers tracked charges filed against 219
suspects. 18  Although the authors reach different substantive policy
conclusions, data from both studies bear out the intuition that significant
consequences turn on the decision to invoke or waive the right to silence. First,
Leo found that suspects who invoked their right to silence or to a lawyer were
charged at a slightly higher rate (73%) than suspects who agreed to answer
police questions (69%).186 This supports the conclusion that refusing to answer
police questions increases police suspicion. 187
Even more significant are the outcomes of suspects who agreed to answer
police questions but who did not make any incriminating statements during
interrogation (who I will refer to as "cooperating suspects") compared with
179. See generally Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMiNoLoGY 266 (1996).
180. Id. at 268.
181. See id at 269 ("I analyze the effects of police interrogation practices, Miranda
warnings, and incriminating statements on the subsequent stages of the criminal process, such as
the adjudication of guilt, case disposition, and sentencing.").
182. Id. at 287-89.
183. See generally Cassell & Hayman, supra note 174.
184. Id. at 842.
185. Id. at 852.
186. Id. at 287. The four percent disparity in outcomes, however, was not statistically
significant. Id. Nonetheless, the data does support a statistically significant finding that refusing
to cooperate with interrogators does not improve the likelihood of not being charged. Id. at 288.
187. A recent study of the British experience with the right to silence came to the same
conclusion. See DAvID WOLCHOVER & ANTHONY HEATON-ARMSTRONG, WOLCHOVER AND
HEATON-ARMSTRONG ON CONFEssION EVIDENCE 632-33 (1996) (finding that suspects who
remain silent are more likely, in borderline cases, to be charged).
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those of suspects who refused to submit to interrogation or who terminated an
ongoing interrogation ("noncooperating suspects"). Here, the disparity appears
more dramatic. Although Leo's study did not directly contrast the outcomes of
these two groups, a review of his published data shows that noncooperating
suspects were convicted in 53% of the cases, 188 whereas cooperating suspects
were convicted only 43% of the time.
189
The impact was even more significant on charging decisions. In Leo's
study, whereas 73% of noncooperating suspects were charged,' 90 only 56% of
cooperating suspects were charged. 191  Cooperating successfully with
interrogators thus appears to improve the likelihood of avoiding charges by
more than 33%.
Cassell and Hayman's data shows a comparable disparity, finding that
whereas noncooperating suspects were ultimately convicted in 70.6% of cases,
cooperating suspects were convicted in only 49.3% of cases. 192 Cassell and
Hayman also found that prosecutors filed charges in 81.0% of cases in which
suspects invoked their rights, compared with 74.0% when suspects successfully
cooperated. 93 Even more striking is the disparity revealed by Cassell and
Hayman's data in dismissal rates. Whereas the authors found that
noncooperating suspects had charges dismissed or entered pleas in abeyance 94
only 7.7% of the time-the lowest rate of all categories, including confessing
suspects-30.2% of cooperating suspects won dismissals or entered pleas in
abeyance. 195
188. Leo, supra note 179, at 288 tbl.l 1.
189. Id. at 299 tbl.16.
190. Id. at 288 tbl.10.
191. Id. at 299 tbl.16. Cooperating defendants also had their cases dismissed at a high rate
(fifty-three percent). Id. I could not determine, however, from Leo's published data what the
dismissal rate was in those cases in which suspects invoked their Miranda rights. Similar data
was reported in Paul Softley's study of police interrogation in the U.K. See SOFTLEY, supra
note 175, at 45 (reporting that "[a]mong those who had neither confessed nor made an
admission, one half were released and one half were prosecuted").
192. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 174, at 915 tbl. 17.
193. Id. at 908 tbl. 15. It is not clear whether the difference is statistically significant. See
id. at 908 n.317 ("Comparing those successfully questioned to all others produced a definite
trend that just missed significance at the .05 level, but was significant at the. 10 level (pr [the
likelihood of such a correlation occurring randomly] = .054). Comparing those successfully
questioned to those unsuccessfully questioned was chi-square significant at the .05 level."). In
comparison, prosecutors filed charges in 87.5% of cases in which they obtained incriminating
statements. Id at 908 tbl. 15.
194. See id. at 909-10 ("Under such a plea, a defendant enters a plea of guilty, but charges
are dropped if the defendant does not commit any new offenses within a set period of time.").
195. Id. at 912 tbl. 16. The authors state, however, that these disparities are not statistically
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In short, the data from both studies shows that accepting the interrogation
subwager has a significant impact on the outcome of the case. Suspects who
successfully cooperate with interrogators are more likely to see charges
dismissed, more likely to receive a charge concession in plea bargaining, and
less likely to be convicted if their case does in fact go to trial. Although the
difference in outcomes between cooperating and noncooperating suspects might
ultimately be caused by other factors, the data is consistent with the hypothesis
that prosecutors treat cooperation itself as a potential signal of innocence and
take that information into account in charging and plea bargaining. The
tangible benefits of successful cooperation, moreover, help explain why
suspects choose to submit to interrogation at such high rates notwithstanding
Miranda. The data also show that the costs incurred by guilty suspects who
gamble on the subwager are high. Suspects who take the subwager and lose
(that is, confessing suspects) incur the greatest costs. Losing subwagerers are
far less likely to have charges dismissed or to receive a charge concession in
plea bargaining, and are most likely to be convicted if their cases go to trial.
Finally, suspects who decline the gamble fall somewhere in the middle, being
less likely than successfully cooperating suspects to receive a charge concession
in plea bargaining, but more likely to receive such a concession than suspects
who took the interrogation subwager and lost.
The subwager hypothesis predicts not only that suspects who refuse to
cooperate in interrogation should be treated less leniently by prosecutors, but
also that they should be more likely to take the moderate discount contained in
the initial plea offer than defendants who take the interrogation subwager. As
to this prediction, the data is not consistent. Leo's data appears to contradict
that prediction, showing that cooperating suspects resolved their cases through
guilty pleas twice as often as noncooperating suspects. 196  Cassell and
Hayman's data, on the other hand, is consistent with the hypothesis. Their data
showed that noncooperating suspects resolved their cases with guilty pleas at
significant. Id. at 913.
196. See Leo, supra note 179, at 289 tbl. 12 (finding that defendants who waived their
rights resolved cases through plea bargaining 48.51% of the time, as opposed to the 24.32%
plea resolution rate among those who invoked their Miranda rights). Of course, there are other
factors that affect these rates. Most important is Leo's finding that individuals with criminal
histories invoked their Miranda rights more frequently than those without criminal histories.
See id. at 286 ("[A] suspect with a felony record in my sample was almost four times as likely to
invoke his Miranda rights as a suspect with no prior record and almost three times as likely to
invoke as a suspect with a misdemeanor record."). Criminal history might well impact
prosecutorial plea-bargaining strategies. Unfortunately, Leo's published data does not permit
comparison of the plea offers made to waiving and invoking defendants.
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the highest rate (92.3%), and went to trial the least (0.0%). 197 Cooperating
suspects, in comparison, resolved their cases through plea bargaining at a
65.7% rate, and those who did received larger plea discounts.' 98 Nearly 40% of
suspects who were questioned unsuccessfully received plea discounts of two to
three charge levels, whereas only 7.7% of noncooperating suspects received the
larger discount. 199 Finally, the vast majority (69.2%) of noncooperating
suspects in the Cassell and Hayman study settled their cases for what appears to
be a modest discount-one charge level-whereas slightly less than half of the
cooperating suspects settled for the modest discount (48.4%).20 Cassell and
Hayman's data shows exactly the pattern expected if interrogation operates as a
subwager: Suspects are presented with the choice to accept the subwager.
Those that do and win get the best outcomes. Those that do and lose get the
worst, and those who decline to accept the subwager settle their cases for a
modest, intermediate-sized discount. The small sample size in the Cassell and
Hayman study, and the inconsistencies between the two studies as to plea rates
of noncooperating suspects, however, mean that further empirical research in
this area is necessary before any strong claims can be made about whether, and
under what circumstances, the interrogation subwager translates into
predictable plea discounts.
B. Interrogation as a Subwager
For any procedural device to provide the signaling benefits of the
subwager model discussed above, it must satisfy the preconditions of signaling
mechanisms generally. Recall again the criteria. Effective signals must be
costly, costs must be differentially distributed, the distribution must be related
to the quality signaled, and the decision to signal must be economical.20 1 How
does interrogation fare on these criteria?
The answer, I think, is mixed. First, submitting to interrogation is costly.
Every suspect who agrees to answer questions risks making an admission that
might be used against him in court. Even innocent suspects incur costs by
submitting to interrogation, and those costs might be substantial in some
197. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 174, at 912 tbl. 16.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (describing the basic criteria
necessary for reliable signaling).
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cases. 20 2 Second, there is clearly some cost differential between innocent and
guilty suspects. Although innocent suspects incur costs by submitting to
interrogation, guilty suspects incur higher costs because it is much easier for an
innocent suspect to tell a consistent credible story than it is for guilty suspects.
The costs, however, are not perfectly distributed. Because answering questions
is ultimately voluntary, guilty suspects have some ability to monitor the
progress of the interrogation and prevent revelation of incriminating
information. That ability, however, is limited. Once questioning begins, the
suspect relinquishes substantial control over the shape and direction of the
203questioning. Interrogators, moreover, can probably gauge with decent
accuracy when suspects are not being forthright in their responses. So even
when incriminating information is withheld during the interrogation, it will
remain much harder for guilty suspects to falsely convince interrogators that
they have nothing to hide.
Still, there is no doubt that some guilty suspects do trick interrogators into
believing their false exculpatory stories. Guilty suspects talk in the majority of
cases and innocent suspects sometimes do not.204  Estimates regarding
interrogation success rates vary from as low as 32% to as high as 76%.205 Leo
found that incriminating statements were obtained in 76% of cases in which
defendants submitted to interrogation;2°6 Cassell and Hayman report a success
202. For example, a suspect in a murder case undoubtedly strengthens the state's case by
truthfully explaining to authorities that he killed the victim in self-defense because he admits
presence at the crime scene and the actus reus of the offense.
203. For that reason, interrogation will work best as the basis for an evidentiary subwager
where the defendant contends that he or she is factually innocent and commits to that position
early in the investigative process.
204. Leo's data found that only 21.7% of suspects invoked their rights after receiving
Miranda warnings. Leo, supra note 179, at 276 tbl.3.
205. Leo surveys a variety of studies, most of which estimated successful interrogations
occurring at a lower rate. See id. at 280-81 (citing Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in
Colorado: The Implementation ofMiranda, 47 DENy. L.J. 1, 13 (1970) (reporting 32% success
rate); David W. Neubauer, Confessions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 104-06 (1974) (reporting 46% success rate); Michael L. Wald et al.,
Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1566 (1967)
(reporting 51% success rate); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the
Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact ofMiranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRiM.
L. & CRMiNOLOGY 320, 325 (1973) (reporting 67% success rate); Evelle Younger, Results ofa
Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's Office of Los Angeles County Regarding the Effect
of the Miranda Decision Upon the Prosecution of Felony Cases, 5 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 32, 35
(1966) (reporting 50% success rate)).
206. Leo, supra note 179, at 280.
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rate of only 42.2%.207 There is, of course, no way to tell what percentage of
interrogations produced either false positives or false negatives.2 °8 The
possibility that a guilty suspect will successfully withstand interrogation,
however, is probably sufficiently robust that many guilty suspects willingly take
the risk, while the hazards of falsely confessing or otherwise making
incriminatory admissions are sufficiently high that at least some innocent
defendants decline to submit to interrogation notwithstanding the potential
benefits of doing so. This, of course, waters down the signal's value. The
extent to which this watering down occurs probably varies from case to case,
just as the apparent cost of submitting to interrogation varies depending on the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Particularities relating to the
nature of the crime, the suspect, and the evidence available to the police prior to
interrogation will all greatly impact the suspect's chances of maintaining a false
but credible story. Although these factors may well be known to police and
prosecutors, the fact that they will vary from case to case makes generalization
difficult about the signaling value of a suspect's decision to submit to
interrogation. Still, although interrogation is far from a perfect science, it does
tend to produce relevant and, not infrequently, dispositive evidence, and thus
the decision to submit to it at least some of the time will have signaling value.
In addition, although interrogators do not obtain incriminating statements in
every interrogation, empirical success rates are less important than perceived
success rates. Subwagers based on interrogation will still signal the suspect's
private knowledge of guilt or innocence as long as the suspect believes
interrogation will reveal the truth.209
207. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 174, at 871 (concluding, additionally, that the
post-Miranda success rate was lower than the pre-Miranda success rate based on earlier studies
of the effectiveness of interrogation).
208. The DNA exoneration cases document the fact that some innocent defendants falsely
confess to crimes they did not commit. There also are undoubtedly many cases in which
innocent suspects made incriminating statements that, though not full confessions, were used to
help convict the defendant at trial.
209. For example, assume that lie-detector tests are no better than tarot cards at revealing
whether an individual is telling the truth, and that their results are inadmissible in court. A
subwager conditioning a more lenient price for successful questioning under the lie-detector
would still effectively separate guilty and innocent defendants as long as the defendants
themselves believed the lie-detector results were accurate and admissible in court because only
subjectively innocent suspects would take the subwager. This tactic is, in fact, sometimes used.
See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing a situation where the
results of a lie detector test were inconclusive, but significance was still assigned to the test
taker's responses). The court described the situation as follows:
While burglarizing the home of Emmett and Elma Konzelman, either Smith or his
criminal companion, Jacob Edmonds, bludgeoned eighty-seven-year-old Mr.
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Third, the signal is not arbitrary. Although the costs of sending a credible
innocence signal may not always be evenly differentiated, the decision to
cooperate with interrogators is directly and intuitively related to the suspect's
guilt or innocence.
Finally, interrogation appears to satisfy the criterion that signaling be
economical. That is, signaling costs for innocent suspects seem sufficiently
low, and the payoff for successful signaling sufficiently high, that signaling is a
rational choice. Not only do some suspects find it economical to attempt to
signal innocence by submitting to interrogation, most do.21 0 Indeed, so many
suspects submit to interrogation that a puzzle arises. If interrogation acts as a
subwager in the manner discussed and suspects are properly informed about the
consequences of their choices, most innocents should talk and most guilty
suspects should remain silent. But data show that the vast majority of suspects,
including guilty suspects, submit to interrogation. 21 1 Why do so many guilty
suspects apparently make such bad bets? There are a variety of possible
answers. One possibility is that suspects are in fact foolish or ignorant. Guilty
suspects talk because they are unaware that there is a better strategy. Silence
may not provide enough benefit to guilty suspects, or it may not be apparent to
them that it does.
Alternatively, silence may be too beneficial to suspects. The strong legal
protections for silence extended by Miranda may have caused police to feel
(correctly or not) that they cannot make cases without interrogation evidence.
The benefits of attempting to signal innocence by submitting to interrogation
are outweighed by the potential costs of doing so. Where that is true and
known to suspects, however, there is no marginal benefit in signaling even for
innocent suspects. In such cases, signaling is uneconomical, and rational
suspects will not signal. The perverse result of this dilemma, however, might
be that police feel compelled to apply strong psychological pressure to get
suspects to talk. Given that pressure, guilty suspects may talk not because they
Konzelman to death with a three-foot long crowbar. After Edmonds told police
that Smith killed Konzelman, the prosecution offered Edmonds a plea deal
contingent on his passing a polygraph examination. The results of the polygraph
test were inconclusive, but the examiner opined that Edmonds had answered the
questions truthfully and Edmonds entered the plea deal in exchange for his
testimony against Smith.
Id.
210. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 174, at 860 tbl.3 (finding that only 16.3% of
suspects in the study invoked their Miranda rights and refused questioning); Leo, supra note
179, at 276 tbl.3 (noting that 78.29% of suspects waived their Miranda rights).
211. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (providing examples of such data).
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believe it is in their rational interests, but because they believe that have no real
choice. Everyone talks, and again no signaling results. Although the extent of
pressure placed on suspects undoubtedly varies, it is probably safe to say that
interrogation functions as a signaling mechanism some of the time, but that it is
dependent on a confluence of factors to create the proper conditions. This is
perfectly consistent with signaling theory. As Spence concluded about
signaling in the labor market, whether a signaling mechanism produces a
separating or pooling equilibrium depends upon the specific parameters that
define the signaling model.212
C. Implications
If the analysis here is correct, plea bargain theory must be modified to
account for the substantial likelihood that plea bargain prices are influenced by
signaling. Pretrial interrogation creates an obvious dilemma for guilty suspects,
and the defendant's response to interrogation generates a signal permitting
some plea price differentiation to occur among guilty and innocent defendants,
a prediction supported by the empirical data. Even apart from the substantive
information obtained from interrogation, the choice to submit to interrogation
serves as an important signal to police and prosecutors that is manifested in
plea prices. In short, there is good reason to believe that plea bargains are
negotiated not only in the shadows of trial, but also in the shadows of strategic
choices made by suspects prior to trial and, especially, in the interrogation
room. Moreover, because interrogation-room subwagers take place in a far less
legally regulated environment than trial, police and prosecutors are in a better
position than jurors to acquire signaling information. They can then put that
information to use for purposes of plea bargaining, making bargaining
outcomes marginally more accurate than conventional trial shadow theory
would predict.
Indeed, plea-bargaining outcomes in a regime where interrogation
effectively functions as a signaling device may well be superior to those that
would be generated were plea bargaining abolished. Because signaling occurs
between prosecutors and suspects, and because that signaling information is
hard to communicate to juries, the impact on plea prices can easily be
overlooked by plea-pricing models dependent on trial shadows. Unless
prosecutors had some way to communicate to juries the signals they receive,
212. See Spence, supra note 85, at 368 (noting that multiple equilibria are a "distinct
possibility" of a signaling model).
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which the rules barring comment on a defendant's pretrial silence prevent,
abolition of plea-bargaining would have the perverse result of decreasing the
total amount of information available to assess guilt and innocence.213
The signaling analysis also has a variety of practical implications. First, if
interrogation already functions informally as a subwager with signaling effects
on plea prices, the stakes involved in the debate over acceptable interrogation
practices are even higher (if they can be any higher) than supposed. Even
interrogations that fail to produce useful or admissible evidence have an impact
on case outcomes if police and prosecutors' charging decisions are affected not
only by what suspects say in the interrogation room, but also by their
willingness to submit to interrogation in the first instance.
Equally important, accurate plea-bargaining outcomes depend on ensuring
that interrogation is effective, on one hand, but that it does not produce false-
positives, on the other.214 Innocent defendants must believe that cooperation
with investigators is a rational course. Confidence can be enhanced by
increasing suspects' perceptions that police interrogation will be conducted
fairly for purposes of discovering truth. Innocent suspects must be confident
that truthful answers will not be misconstrued or taken out of context and used
to falsely convict them. At the same time, interrogation cannot be rendered so
toothless that guilty suspects are encouraged to hazard it. Rather, from a
signaling perspective guilty suspects need to be encouraged to opt for silence
and a modest plea deal rather than attempt to falsely exculpate themselves, a
strategy that is costly both to them and to actually innocent defendants.
Walking this tightrope is obviously difficult, but there are some steps-such as
videotaping interrogations-that would seem well suited to addressing both
goals. Additionally, a renewed commitment to conforming interrogations not
213. Indeed, comparing the model to data regarding suspect cooperation rates suggests that
contrary to Seidmann and Stein's conclusions regarding the anti-pooling effects of a strong right
to silence, signaling effectiveness might be increased by weakening that right. Rather than
maximize the value of silence, legal rules might better induce an anti-pooling effect by
decreasing pressure on police to override a suspect's preference for silence. Ifjurors could be
informed of the defendant's silence, then police might feel less compelled to elicit confessions.
Innocent suspects would then have an incentive to talk, while guilty suspects would still fear
incrimination. In any case, a very delicate balance is required to preserve the signaling
mechanism. Silence can be neither so costly as to make it equivalent to confession (in which
case everyone will talk), nor so cheap that everyone opts for it, making it overly difficult for
police to convict the guilty.
214. This is the problem of managing signaling costs so they satisfy Spence's cost criteria.
See Spence, supra note 85, at 367 ("Therefore, effective signaling depends not only upon the
negative correlation of costs and productivities, but also upon there being a 'sufficient' number
of signals within the appropriate cost range.").
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73 (2009)
only with the letter, but the spirit, of Miranda might also enhance the signaling
power of interrogation by maximizing the voluntariness of the interrogation
choice. Seen in this light, even staunchly pro-law-enforcement advocates might
appreciate that Miranda's contribution to plea bargaining is more nuanced than
its critics suppose.
Second, the need to obtain reliable signals from criminal suspects helps
explain some highly criticized features of criminal procedure. For example, as
discussed above, many writers have called for discovery reforms to strengthen
defendants' access to pre-plea discovery. 215 But the net benefits of enhanced
discovery must be evaluated not only with respect to improving bargaining
efficiency, but also in light of the need to maximize the accuracy of the
system's signaling mechanisms. Current discovery rules limit the ability of
guilty defendants to make fully informed plea bargain decisions in a strategic
sense, but that effect is a direct consequence of the goal of maximizing the
informational value of guilty pleas. Indeed, with the notable exception of
North Carolina v. Alford,21 6 the Supreme Court's plea bargaining cases are
overwhelmingly predicated on the notion that guilty pleas are confessions, not
strategic choices.217 Seen in this light, providing criminal defendants more
215. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (summarizing critics' arguments for
greater defendant access to pre-plea discovery and explaining the costs and benefits of such
discovery for defendants).
216. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33 (1970) (permitting defendant charged
with capital murder to plead guilty while maintaining factual innocence and acknowledging that
"'reasons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead"' (quoting State
v. Kaufinan, 2 N.W. 275, 276 (Iowa 1879))).
217. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (stating that defendants
in plea bargaining "are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial
persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation"); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742,758 (1970) (finding confessions that result from plea bargaining generally voluntary,
partially based on the view that plea bargaining does not increase the likelihood that defendants
"would falsely condemn themselves," and based on "expectations... that pleas of guilty are
voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel").
As such, guilty pleas routinely have been held to waive a defendant's claim to procedural rights.
See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989) (finding a guilty plea voluntary despite
counsel's failure to point out a potential defense); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973) (finding a guilty plea voluntary despite counsel's failure to find a potential constitutional
infirmity in grand jury proceedings); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (finding
no grounds to withdraw a guilty plea where counsel "misjudged the admissibility" of a
"confession"); Brady, 397 U.S. at 757 (finding a guilty plea voluntary even though defendant
"misapprehended the quality of the State's case" and the "likely penalties"). In light of the
defendant's supposedly truthful and accurate confession, courts have ruled that procedural
rights designed to protect the accuracy of the truth-finding process are rendered effectively
obsolete, and therefore subject to forfeiture. In United States v. Ruiz, for example, the Court
concluded that Ruiz was not entitled to disclosure of exculpatory impeachment evidence under
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information during plea-bargaining would tend to dilute the reliability of their
admissions of guilt.21 8 Although the Court's assumption that guilty pleas are
reliable and non-strategic is empirically questionable, the aspiration it reflects is
consistent with the signaling analysis presented here.2 19 If a defendant is forced
to make an independent assessment of trial outcomes in the absence of reliable
information about the evidence that will actually be introduced at trial, she
inevitably must rely on private information to make it. As such, her untutored
plea reveals relevant and otherwise unobservable information about her guilt or
innocence.2 2 °
Weak judicial regulation of police deception in interrogation serves a
similar function. As with all signaling mechanisms, interrogation will most
effectively provide a separating signal for innocent and guilty suspects where
the cost differential of sending the innocence signal, that is, accepting the
interrogation subwager, is greatest. 22' The risk that guilty suspects can
effectively game the interrogation subwager is minimized by the suspect's
Brady because such evidence is relevant to the "fairness of trial," not the voluntariness of a
guilty plea. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (concluding that the
Constitution does not require pre-guilty plea disclosure of impeachment information).
218. As one commentator observed, if the litigation process is thought of as a "search for
truth," then a guilty plea conviction "is not impaired by any weakness in the trial evidence which
the prosecutor could have adduced had the issue of guilt been contested." H. Richard Uviller,
Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 102, 114 (1977).
219. There is ample anecdotal evidence that defendants routinely plead guilty to offenses
they did not commit. We know for a fact that innocent people plead guilty. Although we do not
know how often, given that the incentives inherent in the plea bargaining system are structured
in a way that make guilty pleas the rational strategy irrespective of the defendant's guilt or
innocence, its frequency may be substantial. As Daniel Givelber notes, the problem of
convicted innocents is "invisible" for a variety of reasons, including that the legal system is not
structured to adjudicate actual innocence (only if the defendant is guilty or not-guilty), and there
are no formal pronouncements made or judicial opinions written after evidence of innocence
does surface. Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningfrul Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RuTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1323-25 (1997). Even more
fundamentally, it is conceptually difficult, if not impossible, to determine who has been falsely
convicted because doing so would require access to a guilt-innocence sorting mechanism
superior to the mechanisms officially used-trial and guilty pleas-and no such mechanisms
exist.
220. The point is not to increase the number of guilty pleas or to mimic probable trial
outcomes, but to force defendants to rely on a different data set-the defendant's privately held
information-which is not accessible to investigators (and might never become accessible to a
jury)--rather than the state's evidence in estimating the likelihood of conviction. The abilityto
withhold pretrial discovery strategically provides a further opportunity to structure a more
effective subwager. Contingent discovery regimes are increasingly common.
221. See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (discussing use of deceptive
interrogation tactics and their effects on guilty and innocent suspects).
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uncertainty as to the direction questioning might take. The law and practice of
interrogation have evolved in ways that help police maximize uncertainty. For
instance, police have developed numerous interrogation tactics based on
deception, tactics (including lying about and concealing evidence) which the
Supreme Court has consistently approved,222 and which researchers have found
are frequently used.223  Although quite arguably unfair, such tactics
undoubtedly make it difficult for guilty suspects to gauge whether a false
exculpatory account is consistent with facts already known to police, and
therefore increase the difficulty of maintaining a coherent and plausible but
untruthful account of innocence. 224  Deceptive interrogation tactics thus
discourage guilty suspects from hazarding interrogation and make silence a
more appealing option. And precisely because silence is more appealing to
guilty suspects, innocent suspects who can cheaply cooperate in the
interrogation room benefit. The increase in signaling costs for guilty suspects,
but not innocent ones, directly facilitates their self-separation.
Third, the analysis suggests ways that additional private information might
be productively harvested from criminal defendants. Although in most cases
interrogation will precede charging and therefore any information obtained
from it will already have been incorporated into the plea price, there may be
some cases in which circumstances permit a more conscious exploitation of the
subwager device. In some cases, charging precedes arrest, such as in cases
arising from grand jury investigations. In others, charging occurs absent
interrogation because police did not bother to interrogate, because the
defendant initially invoked his Miranda rights, because the defendant was
represented at the time of arrest or shortly thereafter and the attorney prevented
interrogation, or because the police otherwise lacked information or opportunity
to conduct an early interrogation. In those cases, the defendant's cooperation in
interrogation might explicitly be made a part of bargaining over plea prices.
Even if an initial interrogation was conducted, interrogation might be useful as
a subwager device where new evidence justifies additional, post-charge
questioning.
222. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990) (affirming a conviction based
on a confession induced from a prisoner by an undercover police officer posing as a fellow
inmate planning to escape).
223. See Leo, supra note 179, at 278 (characterizing "confront[ing] suspect[s] with false
evidence of guilt" as a tactic that was used often during the course of the interrogations observed
by the researcher).
224. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 72, at 443 (explaining that a guilty defendant's
effort to bluff innocence may backfire if police discover the bluff, thereby furnishing "further
evidence of his guilt").
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Finally, subwager devices might be constructed around defendants'
investigational cooperation more broadly. Here I mean something different
than the kind of investigational cooperation that prosecutors frequently
negotiate for to help them investigate and prosecute crime. Defendants, of
course, already receive substantial plea discounts for cooperating with police
and prosecutors. But the usual plea discount follows provision of useful
inculpatory information-that is, defendants can get a plea break by admitting
guilt and implicating others.22 ' Like discounts for "acceptance of
responsibility," the irony of typical cooperation discounts is that they are only
available to guilty defendants. Because, by definition, innocent defendants are
not in a position to provide useful inculpatory information to law enforcement,
they may as a group receive worse plea deals than their guilty brethren.
Defendants who agree to make open-ended commitments to affirmatively
cooperate with prosecutors and law enforcement agents by submitting to
interrogation and by providing other assistance in investigating the facts of their
case, and against whom prosecutors do not obtain additional incriminating
evidence as a result of that cooperation, should be rewarded with a different
type of cooperation discount, one that is comparable to that awarded to
defendants for acceptance of responsibility. Such investigational cooperation
discounts would signal defendants' subjective belief in their own innocence
and would, in effect, replicate the subwager dynamic, further helping to
improve the pricing accuracy of the plea bargaining process. By providing
incentives to innocent defendants to truthfully proclaim innocence, they would
also minimize the perverse incentives of wrongfully convicted defendants to
falsely confess guilt to limit their sentencing exposure or enhance their chance
of parole.2 26
225. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2007) (authorizing
sentence reduction based on government submission of a letter acknowledging provision by
defendant of "substantial assistance" in investigating or prosecuting criminal activity).
226. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner's Dilemma: Consequences of Failing
to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REv. 491,497 (2008) (noting that proclaiming
innocence at parole hearings hinders the possibility of parole, placing wrongfully convicted
prisoners in a "true 'prisoner's dilemma"'); id. at 535 (noting that defendant's "acceptance of
responsibility" is required at plea hearings by federal rules governing guilty pleas and is
rewarded with sentencing concessions under the Sentencing Guidelines).
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V. Conclusion
Plea bargaining is part of a complex system of criminal justice with
dynamic and interdependent parts; its outcomes are a product of a wide array of
factors, including draconian sentencing schemes and enormous prosecutorial
charge discretion that may create fundamental bargaining disparities and, as a
result, unfair bargains. An additional source of unfairness, however, is implicit
in the basic economic model underpinning plea bargaining: The risk that
bargaining, which occurs in the shadow of trials, misprices the guilty pleas of
innocent defendants. Plea bargaining's pricing model misprices pleas in part
because it fails to incorporate a critically important piece of information-the
defendant's subjective knowledge of guilt or innocence-into the pricing
mechanism.
Effective signaling mechanisms, however, promise the possibility of
mitigating that defect. At least in theory, subwagers might be used to increase
the accuracy of negotiation even though one party never receives private
information directly and would not have credited the information had it come
straight from the party who did have it. In practice, interrogation appears to
function as a subwager device, signaling guilt or innocence to police and
prosecutors in ways that likely increase the accuracy of resulting plea bargains.
Although it will never provide a perfect separating signal, the analysis of
subwagers suggests both that they do increase the amount of available
information, and that there are opportunities to further exploit the signaling
possibilities of subwagers in plea bargaining.
